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INTRODUCTION
9
Language is a collective possession of our social
organism. It is well-nigh indispensible for all action
and thought on the social plane. But even as it facili-
tates thought, it also coerces and confuses thought.
The purpose of this thesis is to make a study of
certain sources of ambiguity and falsification that in-
here in language itself as an instrument of thought and
medium of communication. Such a study obviously will
attend, not to the forms of language which are classi-
fied by Etymology and Grammar and Syntax, but to the
Meanings attached to words functioning in language.
It is the further purpose of this thesis to suggest
that the critique of language which arises from the study
of Meaning may be of service to the teaching of English
in the Senior Eigh School. In texts on the teaching of
English, "clear, constructive thinking" is the phrase
that best expresses the aims of such instruction. But if
the phrase is not to remain empty, some more integral
^ approach to the science of Language must be devised than
the traditional, and somewhat haphazard, techniques of
vocabulary-building, more or less functional grammar-

study, theme-construction, prficis-wrlting, and the study
of literary classics. Interpretation of the printed
page and the spoken word is fundamental for all intel-
lectual progress; and Interpretation can only be improved
when the psychology of the speech-transaction is known
and taught, and when the flaws in the tools of communi-
cation are recognized.
Communication through language might he said to be
analogous to the wireless transmission of a photograph*
The material is first cut up or "articulated" according
to a certain convention, so as to obtain a linear trans-
mission in the dimension of time 5 then it is sent out;
and being received at the other end, it is recomposed
into a spatial unity. If minds were as constant as the
mechanical apparatus, and as limited, there would be
little left to say.
There are three "loci" of possible distortion in thq
complete transaction. The material may not be appropri-
ately "articulated"; the medium of transmission may have
unsuspected flaws that defeat a perfect reception; and
the receiver may fail to recompose correctly, or interpret
the articulations.
Much attention is given by Education to the first
process. The child is taught to translate his environment
r
and inner needs into words, so that he may communicate.
And the final stage in the process, that of Interpretation,
has been treated correlatively, as the simple reverse-
action of the first. Only recently has Psychology shown
the highly complicated and individual nature of this
stage. Meanwhile, the nature of language itsilf, as
the medium for imparting knowledge, receives the least
systematic attention of all. Pew and fragmentary are the
insights into the subterfuges of language that reach the
student who is being moulded by its agency
i
Of course, there is always Grammar, the constricting
corsetry of language. Pupils dislike it. For teachers,
it is something tangible and definite to teach, but
otherwise uninspiring. Its arbitrary nature provokes
endless dispute among educators. Built to accommodate
the older, synthetic languages, it is a Procrustean frame
for the versatile and analytic English.
And at the other pole, there is Appreciation. Formerly,
the "classics" were subjected to a gruesome grammatical
dissection. Poetry was parsed. Then in the liberal swing
of the pendulum, all this was dropped as pedantry, and
the gems of literature were displayed for Appreciation.
But recent objective studies of pupil-comprehension
reveal an appalling poverty of the untutored interpretation.
At present there _ia_8^noticeable return to Grammar, though
^' vide: Downey, June E.-- Creative Imagination. Studies in
the Psychology of Literature. Harcourt, Brace & Co.
New York. 1929.
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the newer treatment is endeavoring to be "functional".
Between Graimnar and Literature, we find Composition
and Rhetoric. These afford valuable practice in the
correct, and even the imaginative, use of language-tools.
But no very systematic insight into the nature of the
instrument is brought to bear on the teaching of compo-
sition. Teachers attempt to standardize the judgment of
results, while the art of clear thinking continues to be
taught by scattered precepts that do not delve to the
real sources of muddy thought. "Dread of the bewilderment
that might ensue if we recognized and investigated the
inevitable ambiguity of almost all verbal formulae is
probably a strong reason for our general reluctance to
2
admit it."
None of the established departments of knowledge have
preempted this study of Meaning. Linguistics treats mainly
the structure of languages. Philosophy and Logic have been
notoriously the dupes of their linguistic tools. Psychol-
ogy deals gingerly with the subject. Nevertheless, a
variety of material can be found and sifted for principles
that may advance the teaching of Interpretation in High
School English. A verbal discornment is better taught
than a mass of information quickly forgotten. A study of
Meaning is the foundation for clear thinking.
^* vide: Rivlin, Harry.-- Functional Grammar. Teachers* College,
Columbia TJ. Contributions to Education, No. 455.
Teachers' Coll. Bureau of Publications. N.Y. 1930.
2.
Richards, I. A.-- Practical Criticism. Harcourt, Brace & Co.
New York. 1930. (p. 341).

CHAPTEB I
Purview of the Problem of Meaning
It is not the purpose of this thesis to treat histor-
ically the flux of human notions on the subject of Meaning,
but rather to ransack the subject for such principles aa
may seem to have pertinence in modern education for right
judgment. On that account, we need glance only cursorily
at the notions of antiquity regarding language.
The first matter to interest us is the belief, widely
prevalent in primitive cultures, that language originated
all at once, as the gift of some benevolent divinity to
the tribal ancestors. As soon as men grow conscious of
their speech- function, they conceive it to have a sacred
source. An immediate corollary to this is the belief
that the Word is an integral part of the Thing. This is
at the root of all Word Magic. Power over the Thing, or
Person is possible if we can manipulate its, or his, Kame.
This led even to the custom of giving two names, the one
for ordinary use, the other, the real name, to be kept
secret, guarded from conjuration.
This notion that the Word belongs mystically to the
^* Frazer, Sir James.— The Golden Bough. A Study in Magic
and Religion. Abridged Edition. Macmillan & Co.
New York. 1931.
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Thing has vast implications for the student of Mythology
and Religion, And it is important to our survey when we
note that much present-day thought still makes implicit
use of this original superstition. There are still a good
many subtle thinkers who proceed on the implicit premise
that convinced Rastus of the reality of ghosts: how could
there he a name for them, without there being something
for it to be the name of?
Even at the apices of ancient culture, a refinement of
this primitive conception of language is to be found. Greek
thought is steeped in it. The ideal world of Name-Jt-Souls
that Plato evolved is a case in point. The philosophy of
the Pythagoreans similarly subjected the world to idealized
Niimber-Concepts. And Aristotle, though apparently the most
"scientific" of them all, is as palpably enslaved by the
accidents of language as any. "por full two thousand
years," says Mauthner, "human thought has lain under the
influence of this man»s catchwords, an influence which
has been wholly pernicious in its results. There is no
parallel instance of the enduring potency of a system of
words.
"
It was only toward the end of Greek culture that at-
tention was drawn to the function of words as symbols.
This was done by the sceptic Aenesidemus, whoie lost
waitings on a Theory of Signs are summarized by Sextus
c
En^lricus (between 100 and 250 A.D«). But this suggestive
beginning did not reach to extended development and ap-
plication, and need not concern us here.
Thereafter, until the nineteenth century we find but
scattered references to this problem. Christianity im-
posed a formidable logocracy on human thought. The schol-
astics spun out of Aristotle and the Bible an evolved
word-magic, the confining axioms of which went unquestioned,
as faith. Although they never traced the psychological
relations of language to thought, they did develop a
Dialectic, or art of Disputation, that the last century
of empirical science has too much obscured. A new Dialectic,
based on the recent advances in the study of language-
meanings, may emerge in our time, to civilize our term-
inological disputes.
With the beginning of the scientific temper in the
seventeenth century, we find Francis Bacon criticizing
verbalism. His "idola Fori" were, in essence, " idols
imposed by words on the understanding," and these he
felt to be particularly insidious. He notes the lack of
an improved Grammar, and makes several wise comments on
equivocation, but does not, himself, make a systematic
study of the problem.
The Third Book of Locke's "Essay on Human Understanding",
2.
(published in 1690) is devoted to Words. This section
1, vide: Adler, Mortimer. --Dialectic. Harcourt, Brace & Co. Inc.
P New York. 1927.
• Locke, John.-- Of V/ords-or Language in General. Being Book III
of Locke's Essays Concerning Human Understanding.
William Tegg & Co. London. 1877.
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has been slighted by subsequent philosophers, though it
cost Locke many pains. If he had scrupulously avoided
such abuses of words as he noted here, the world might
have been spared much intellectual jugglery.
The abuses which Locke noted are still too vague for
our instruction, but a sampling of them will not be amiss:
" (1) Using v/ords without any, or without clear ideas.
(2) Using words which the propriety of language has
affixed to very important ideas, without any distinct
meaning at all»
(3) An unsteady application of words, or an affected
obscurity by wrong application, now in one sense, now
another . .
.
(4) Taking v/ords for things.
(5) Setting them for what they cannot signify, for ideas
that we have not, or (which is all one) essences that wb
know not.
(6) A supposition that words have a certain and evident
signification.... Some gross and confused conceptions men
indeed ordinarily have, to which they apply the common
words of their language; and such a loose use of their
words serves them well enough in their ordinary discourse
or affairs. But this is not sufficient for philosophical
inquiries. Knowledge and reasoning require precise, de-
terminate ideas. And^ though men will not be so importunately
c
9.
dull as not to understand what others say, ?d.thout de-
manding an explication of their terms, nor so trouble-
somely critical as to correct others in the use of the
words they receive from them; yet where truth and know-
ledge are concerned in the case, I know not what fault
it can be to desire the explication of words whose sense
seems dubious: or why a man should be ashamed to own his
ignorance in what sense another man uses his words... This
abuse of taking words upon trust has nowhere spread so
far, nor with so ill effects, as amongst men of letters...
(7) Figurative speech is also an abuse of language... it
insinuates wrong ideas, moves the passions, and thereby
misleads the judgment. But... it is in vain to find fault
with those arts of deceiving wherein men find pleasure
to be deceived..."
The remedies proposed by Locke partake of the same
grand philosophical generality. He would have us (1) use
no word without an idea; (2) have distinct ideas annexed
to them in modes, i.e. we should decompose a composite
signification into the simple ideas that make it up; (3)
exercise propriety, i.e. that which gives our thoughts
entrance into other men's minds with the greatest ease
and advantage; (4) make known their meaning by synonymous
terms, or showing, or definition; and (5) use constancy
in their signification.
i4
A very different approach is that of Horne Tooke,
whose "Diversions of purley" (1785) attempts to show,
by recourse to philology of an original sort, that the
whole notion of abstract ideas is false. He was led to
this study, amusingly enough, by the loss of a court de-
cision which hung on the interpretation of two small
prepositions. He- traced all parts of speech back to the
noun and the verb , and argued at great length for an
original philosophy of language/
Tooke 's notions of language were carried further by
his disciple, Edward Johnson, Surgeon, whose "Nuces Phil-
osophicae, or The Philosophy of Things as Developed from
2.
the Study of the philosophy of Words" ' , looks upon lan-
guage as "a dish of nuts, every word being a nut, and
having a little bit of moral philosophy for its kernel.
As every shell contains its own proper kernel, so every
word contains its own proper meaning." He proceeds to find
the proper meaning of numbers of words by tracing to
earliest derivations, and goes Tooke one better by show-
ing that all words were originally nouns, not excepting
verbs, which are merely nouns with the signification of
"added circumstances". Thus we have: "to man the ship",
or "to ship the men". In both cases, the words Men and
Shflip are manifestly the names of things. "But in the one
use of them they signify things and nothing more; in the
^* Tooke, John Horne. —Epea pteroenta, or The Diversions of
Purley. (New edition, revised. . .by Richard Taylor).
Printed for Thomas Tegg. London. 1840.
P Simpkin, Marshall & Co. Ipswich:Burton. 1842.
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other, they signify things and something more that is,
what we call certain particular definite relations in
two words, added circumstances; and these added circum-
stances are indicated solely by the manner of using them,
and not by any change in the word, or in the nature of
the word its&if..." In like manner, conjunctions, pre-
positions, and even the lowly articles are disclosed as
the derelict orphans of ancient noun-notions. The latter
portions of the treatise turn to an examination of the
language of abstraction and morality.
Such notable attempts to straighten out the chaos of
meanings in language, by setting back the clock to that
hypothetical stage when each word did have its one meaning
in it as a kernel, will not be heard in a world that has
itself brought flexibility ihto speech. These grapplings
with language remind us irresistibly of a man trying to
pick up a carpet upon which he is standing. He can lift
any part except that on which he is standing. But we cannot
afford to feel superior, we have not escaped the predica-
ment. At best we can say, with I.A.Richards, "The escape
does not lie through the avoidance of abstract discussion
or the relegation of such matters to specialists, for it
is precisely the soecialists who most indulge in mutual
misunderstanding. It does not lie in stricter definition

12.
of leading terms and a more rigid adherence to them
this is the 'militarist' solution of the problem raised
by the fact that people's minds do not work all alike.
It fails because the other people cannot be so easily
persuaded to adopt our point of view. At the worst, they
will seem to. The only way out, in fact, lies in the op-
posite direction, not in greater ripiidity . but in greater
suppleness . The midn that can shift its point of view
and still keep its orientation, that can carry over quite
a new set of definitions the results gained through past
experience in other frameworks, the mind t^?t can rapidly
and without strain or confusion perform the systematic
transformations required by such a shift, is the midd of
the future. It may be objected that there are very few
such minds. But have we ever attempted to train them...?"
A fascinating, though unprofessional, treatment of hhe
2 •
subject is that of A*B. Johnson, in "The Meaning of Words".
A quotation will serve to give the gist of his thesis, as
well as a taste of his terminology: "l have endeavored
that unverbal things shall occupy in creation the rank to
which they are entitled as elder brothers of words. The
unverbal thing to which the word man applies, is certainly
older and more consequential than the word man : the unverbal
thing should, therefore, be deemed the interpretation of
exposition of the meaning of the word Man ; not vice versa,
^' Richards, I. A.-- Practical Criticism. Harcourt, Brace. N.Y.
1930. (p. 343).
2
Johnson, A.B.--The Meaning of Words. D.Appleton t Co. N.Y. 1862,

13.
the word be deemed the interpretation of the unverbal
thing. The like may be said of every other unveffbal
thing, and I have accordingly endeavored that the unverbal
multiplicity of any unverbal thing shall be no longer ob-
scured by its verbal oneness; and that the unverbal di-
versities of any two things shall be no longer estimated
by their verbal oneness or identity. These are, in brief,
my whole doctrine, if you add thereto that I have through-
out assumed for man a treble organization^ sensible,
intellectual, and emotional; and that every word of all
languages must be bounded in its unverbal signification
by the purview of our said three organiims, and be deemed
as heterogeneous in its unverbal signification as the said
three sets of organisms are heterogeneous in their functions.
Words apply indiscriminately to the operations of the three
species of organs, hence words possess a verbal homogeneity
that prevents us from seeing the heterogeneity of their
unverbal meaning. .The defect of Logic consists in its
taking no cognizance of the heterogeneity which exists
in the unverbal meaning of words..."
Although this writer contrived to maintain his quaint
philosophical distance from the arena of linguistics, a
study of the excerpt above will reveal that he did strike
down to one of the major deceptions of language; and even

14.
his triple division of the human organization can find
various suggestions of similar trichotomies in modern
psychology to support it.
Moving on, we coine to a study of meaning that is based
on linguistics. This is "La Vie des Mots", by the French
1.
linguist, Arsene darmesteter. Darmesteter conceives
of language as a living organism obeying psychological
laws, and he attempts "to determine to what extent the
history of changes of sense is a reflex of the changes of
thought, and renders visible the laws of the mind in the
audible expression of its ideas."
Darmesteter ' s illustrations are drawn principally
from French words. He presents many typical changes of
signification, arranged logically, though his analyses,
which broke new ground, were far from complete. At the
same time Hermann Paul worked similarly for the German
language, in his "principlen der Spr achgeschichte'' . These
are both volumes of Semantics, though they merely adumbrate
the science, and do not fully discriminate the field of
Meaning, nor make use of the term "Semantics".
This was reserved for Michel Br^al, whose "Essai de
2.
S5mantique" in 1897 first staked out the new "science",
and developed a terminology more suggestive than exact.
Semantics « also called F^emasiologv . is that branch of phil-
Darmestefcfer , Arsbne.--The Life of Vi/ords as the Symbols of Ideas,
(translator?). London. Kegan Paul, Trench & Co. 1886.
2
.
Br^al, Michel. --Essai de S^mantique. Librairie Hachette.
Paris. 1897.
#
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ology which treats of the meaning or sense-development
of words. It furnishes much illuminating insight into the
flux of meaning underneath the carapaces of single words,
and though it does not extend to a psychological account
of linguistic organization, it affords matter contributory
to our study of the larger aspects of Meaning.
In spite of the fillip that Br^al gave to Linguistics,
his own new science remained for a time without much en-
richment. A few highly scholarly tracings of root-meanings
down through the network of languages, living and dead,
furnished matter for doctoral dissertations, but added
little to the principles ot theory of Meaning. In a number
of broader treatises on Language, the changes of word-meaning
received due notice. AJnong these may be mentioned the
chapter on Semantic Change in Hans Oertel's "Lectures on
the Study of Language". Also the "introduction to the
2.
Study of Language" by Leonard Bloomfield.
The latest and most comprehensive treatment of
Semantics is the as yet untranslated "Science du Mot"
3.
Traitd de S^mantique " of the French linguist A. Carnoy.
Although clothed in a difficult terminology, this pro-
vides a really brilliant classification of types of
meaning change. It will receive more detailed considera-
tion later.
Scribners. New York. 1901.
^' Henry Holt & Co. New York. 1914.
^' Louvain. Editions "Univer sitas". 1927.
II
/
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Forsaking, for the moment, the purely linguistic
approach, v;e find a growing m.imber of diverse grapplings
with the subject of meaning. Direct, if not systematic,
emphasis is laid on the problem by Lady ?/elby, v/hose
1.
"what Is Meaning?" is an independent analysis more
stimulating than informative. The later "Signifies and
Language" adds little to what her first book offered in
solution. Her "Signifies" was a title intended to cover
the proposed study, v/hich implied a careful distinction
between sense
^
meaning , and significance . For Lady Welby,
the reference of sense is mainly instinctive, of meaning:
volitional, and of significance moral. Other writers in-
terpret these terms differently, but this early attempt
to discriminate v/as a step in the right direction. And
her demand for a critique of the metaphors with which
lan,;£;uage is riddled, is noteworthy.
C.S. Peirce, the "father of Pragmatism", evolved
an elaborate account of signs and their meanings, which
he called "Semeiotic". It is to be questioned whether
his terminology did not effect more confusion than clar-
ification. At siny rate, it approaches that esoteric side
of the subject called Symbolic Logic, which strives to
erect a system of algebraic notation to wield concepts
apart from the coercions of common speech. Names prominent
Welby( -Gregory)
,
Lady V.--"What is Meaning"? . London
Macmillan & Co. Ltd. 1903.
I
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in this connection are those of Boole, Schroeder, Jevons,
Leibniz, De Morgan, Prege, MacColl, etc. Anyone interested
in the development of this arcanic science could do no
1,
better than consult C.I. Lewis' "A Surbey of Symbolic Logic".
But this mathematical branch contains little of value for
the interpretation of actual speech-situations, and is
of interest only to professional logicians.
By far the best work devoted to this subject of Speech-
meanings is "The Meaning of Meaning,--=A Study of the In-
fluence of Language Upon Thought, and of the science of
Symbolism", by O.K. Ogden and I. A. Richards. * This
book, besides emphasizing the practical importance of
a Science of Symbolism for general study, undertakes a
far-reaching investigation of the subject, "it is Douht-
ful," says Sapir in a review, *"if the essential limitations
of speech have ever been more vividly, yet sympathetically,
realized than in this radical study of symbolism." It
will figure largely in the later portion of this thesis.
Two books on literary ci'iticism by I. A, Richards are
of especial interest because they attempt to apply the
results of the more general study of meaning to the moot
problems of literature. It is my conviction that the appre-
ciation of literature in the classroom will derive a new
vitality from being linked with a study of the language-
Univ. of Califprnia Press. Berkeley. 1918.
2.
-tiar court. Brace & Co. New York. 1923-5.
3. Sapir, Edward, review in The Freeman, August 22, 1923. (p. 572).
o/
medium, a study no longer limited to the deadly gram-
matical dissection, but bound up with the psychology of
meaning and communication.
Other studies of giind as reflected in its linguistic
organization are legion. But direct and extended reference
to language from the point of view of meaning is infrequent.
Philosophers, psychologists, grammarians, logicians, meta-
physicians, and social scientists all allude to the function
of language in the transfer of knowledge, tt will be suf-
ficient here to mention James Mark Baldwin's "Thought and
Things" (1906) ; Ralph Eaton's "Symbolism and Truth" ( 1925)
;
Prank Lorimer's "The Growth of Reason" (1929); Alfred D.
Sheffield's "Grammar and Thinking' (1912),* Alfred Norhli
V^itehead's "Symbolism- -Its Meaning and Effeet" ( 1927)
;
Jean piaget's "The Language and Thought of the Child'' ( 1926) ;
and Bertrand Russell's "The Analysis of Mind".
It becomes evident, after an initial survey, that
nearly every department of human knowledge has felt, more
or less obscurely, the need to develop some critique of
its functioning language, so as to be reassured that its
verbal patterns are not leading it astray, let few of those
who have had the acuity to recognize language as a source
of possible error have devoted much time to elucidation
of the field. Particularly are educator's satisfied. if they
1o
I
I
I
19.
can bring the pupil up to a minimal level of "correcf*
usage and size of vocabulary, believing that if he has
a dictionary equivalent for the words he is apt to read,
his interpretation will perfect itsilf in practice. Any
student of human suggestibility will attest to the fallacy
of such a notion.
The American's characteristic demand for "the facts"
has, paradoxically, contributed to his greater gullibility.
For his schooling has not helped him to discriminate between
facts and interpretations. He does not knov/ that he will
meet with but few total facts in the course of Iq-Ib life,
and those dumb; whereas selective statements about the fafcts
need only to incorporate the magic word itself, in orde r
to persuade him that he has "the real thing".
"it must be remembered," says Adler, ^' "that facts
are patient of, and indifferent to, the statements that
frame them in certain ways." They do not demand one statement
. rather than another, although man has long hidden the im-
positions of his speech from himself, by supposing that
his statements are governed by the facts." And further,
"the use of language, v/hether for purposes of expression,
command, query, or communication, involves men in contro-
of
versy because/the connotative ambiguity of words and the
pervasive metaphorical character of language."
The study of Meaning, then, wilbl have as a primary
1.
Adler, Mortimer J.^—Dialectic. Harcourt, Brace. N.Y. 1927
(p. 87, p. 101).
Q
function the task of pointing out sources of ambiguity
in language, rfhen this is done, it can proceed to the work
of devising principles for guidance in interpreting more
justly the whole language-transaction.
The two chief approaches are: Semantics, which studies
the "rapport" between the single word and its shifting
references, or meaning; and Symbolism, which studies the
more general influence of language (as s3rm.bol-system)
upon human thought. The first is the offspring of Linguistic
fathered by psychology; the latter, also fathered by Psychol
ogy, has philosophy, ( or Epistemology) as its other parent.
But prior to both these aspects of Meaning, we may glance
at the genetic view of language-meanings.

CHAPTER II
Genetic Views of Meaning
A study of Meaning may well be prefaced by a glance
at theories of the genesis of meaning, in the race and in
the individual child. But questions of this sort are still
unsettled in the wilter of hypotheses. A few observations
on each will suffice.
With regard to the birth of language in the human race,
it will not be necessary to outline the various theories,
the "ding-dong", the "bow-wow", etc., which find mention
of a slighting sort nowadays, and once provided matter
for lusty controversy among professional philologists.
It can be said of these theories that they serve inter-
estingly to ejcplain the selections adduced by their pro-
ponents, and break down elsewhere. No onomatopoeia can
be said to cover the field.
In discussing the origin of semantic sygibols, Garnoy
stresses the mimetic element, however. ^* Noticing that
the great majority of English words commencing with sn
—
express disgust, disdain, or disagreeable reactions, he
is inclined to wonder if this is not a case of real and
original accord between sound and idea. This mimetism is,
if not the creator of language, he says, at least one of the
• Carnoy, A.— Op. cit. (p. 25).
(0
/
22.
circumstances favorable to the success of words.
Allied to this is the recent and fascinating sug-
1.
gestion of Sir Richard Paget, who, on a basis of phon-
etic researches, has elaborated a "gesture theory of
speech". This hypothesis is to the effect that gestures
originally made by the hands and body of the active
primitive man were unconsciously copied by movements of
the mouth, tongue and lips, just as a child learning
to v.'rite, will screw his face into contortions in sym-
pathy with his manual effort. Then, as the hands became
increasingly engaged with implements, the organs of artic-
ulation gradually took up the burden of mimetism, and air
from the lungs rendered these gestures distinct, for com-
munication. "Observations as to the resonance changes which
occur in the production of the vowels and consonants, show
that we accept as identical sounds which are widely dif-
ferent provided that they are made by similar postures and
gestures of the organs of articulation. From this it is
argued that the significant elements in human speech are
the postures and gestures, rather than the sounds. The sounds
serve only to indicate the postures and gestures which pro-
duce them. We lip-read by ear... The different languages
have thus arisen because almost every idea or action can
be pantomimed in many different ways... and construed in
many di fferent ways."
1. Paget, Sir Richard. --Human Speech, Some Observations , liX-
periments, and uonclusions as to the Nature, Origin,
Purpose, and possible Improvement of Human Speech.
Hare our t, Braced Co. N.Y. 1930. (p. 132 ff
.
)
.
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But arguing backwsird from such observations will
be apt to produce theories with an element of the fan-
tastic about them. V/hether or not organic pantomime be
at the root of articulate speech, other forces assuredly
have contributed to the evolution of languages. Hypothesis
is somewhat sterile and metaphysical here.
There remains another source of information regarding
primitive speech. The Ethnographer can correct the pure
philologist on some points, granting the analogy between
extant primitive tribes and our earliest forebears.
The first matter of importance to our study is the
conclusion of the ethnographer that, in its primitive uses,
language is a mode of action and not an instrument of
reflection. The meaning of a word must be gathered from
an analysis of its function in a context of activity.
Utterance and situation are linked. Even primitive nar-
rative speech is a mode of social action, whereby the
situations called up by emotional language serve to pro-
duce a variety of feelings in the audience, and thus to
create links.
1.
Malinowski eii5)hasizes another important aspect
of speech in human Intercourse, that applies no less to
the savage than to the modem. "There is in all human
beings the v/ell-knovm tendency to congregate, to be together...
^' Malinowski, Br onislaw. --The Problem of Meaning in Primi-
tive Languages. Appendix to "The Meaning of Meaning" by
Ogden and Richards. Harcourt, Brace & Co. N.Y. 1925. (p. 452^.
1
Speech is the intimate correlate of this tendency, for,
to a natural man, another man's silence is not a reassuring
factor... The breaking of silence, the first communion of
words is the first act to establish links of fellowship...
after the first formula, there comes a flow of language,
purposeless expressions of preference or aversion....
"There can be no doubt that we have here a new type of
linguistic use^ Phatic Communion, I am tempted to call
it, actuated by the demon of terminological invention---
a type of speech in which ties of union are created by
a mere exchange of words. . .These words fulfil a social
function, and that is their principal aim..."
Since words are to be taken only with reference to
their use in an active social context at first, we can
glimpse the origin of the fallacious attitude toward the
word, in which the latter is regarded as a real entity,
containing its meaning and power, like a Platonic Essence
within it. Words first accompany action; later, when
ritual borrowed the tools of action words^ it was
natural to believe that the word must have acquired, through
contagion, the virtue to affect action even apart from
the original situations.
Another important influence on the growth of meaning
is the selective interest of the savage in those elements
of his environment which are of use to him. Food sources

thus ara primary, and animals as objects of the h\mt» He
tends to personalize all that is prominent functionally
in his environment. Hence Totemism, and sources of Myth.
This selection on the basis of use is carried further,
into the isolation-for-naming of the prominent character-
istic of an object, it will be found in Semantic study.
Malinowski brings his study of primitive meaning to
a close by sketching the first outlines of what might b©
called a genetic primitive Semantics, a science which,
referring to the primitive attitudes of Man toward Reality,
would show the real nature of grammatical categories. He
points out how a crude and unsound attitude toward lan-
guage and meaning must exist, by the rude, functional
nature of its early usages; and how it tends to persist
(by being prone to hypostatize) ; and he traces it into
details of grammatical structure: "por since early exper-
ience warrants the substantival existence of anything
found within the category of crude substance... and sub-
sequent linguistic shifts introduce there such roots as
'going', 'rest', 'motion', etc., the obvious inference
is that such abstract entities or ideas li#e in a real
world of their own. Such harmless adjectives as 'good',
or 'bad', expressing the savage's half-animal satisfaction
or dissatisfaction in a situation, subsequently intrude
into the enclosure reserved for the clumsy, rough-hewn
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blocks of primitive substance, are sublimated into 'Good-
ness' and 'Badness' and create whole theological worlds
1.
and systems of thought, and Religion..."
(Parenthetically, the genetic scientist is not neces-
sarily justified in implying condemnation of the finished
growth on the basis of initial flaws. The misconceptions
of the child need not be permanent. Stout says: "The
belief of the savage in sympathetic magic does not dis-
credit the belief in causal connection as something more
than a mere order of sequence. Similarly, the crudities
of primitive religion do not discredit the advanced forms
in which these crudities are superceded and corrected.")
*
Leaving these considerations of meaning in primitive
speech, a glance at the process of meaning- acquisition
in the child will reveal numerous parallels.
The infant's first sound language is scarce-differ-
entiated, yet functional, sound. It seems to be the spon-
taneous accompaniment of certain bodily states, and it
serves to procure the satisfaction of needs, as if by Magic.
The earliest articulation is not at first worded.
The "mmaaa" that is greeted with goy by the parent haa
Q natural physiological origin which accounts for its
Malinowski. Op cit. (p. 509).
^' Stout, G. p. --Mind and Matter. Macmillan Co, N.Y. 1931. (p. 9).

universality as a root in nearly all languages. It is the
sound naturally produced by the organs of articulation in
relaxed position, by the opening of the mouth and the ex-
pulsion of air, as after sucking at the breast. Hence, also,
the "mammary" g3.ands.
The delighted mother makes this utterance the signal
for her renewed attentions, until it has become the fixed
concomitant of her presence for the baby. It serves to
summon her. Thus in the ingant-world, as in that of the
primitive, we find a basis for the belief in the conjur-
ative power of the word.
The acquisition of further vocabulary comes as the
parents select from the random mimicry and experiments
of the child in articulating, those sounds which most
nearly approximate the simpler v/ords that will be useful
to the child. Words to him are active forces, linked
through repeated experience with the appropriate objects,
so that the sound and the object mutually complete each
other in his mind. The word means only in so far as it
is a 'means' of bringing things about | only as a handle
1.
to acts and objects, and not as a definition of them.
The child, as he grows, singles out objects of his
environment largely on the basis of potential use, as
does the savafee. At first he tries to put everything into
• Malinowski. Op. cit. (p, 489),
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his mouth. He wants to detach objects for his own pur-
poses. This lies at the basis of the destructive tendency,
and also at the basis of the adult mental trait of select-
ing the elements to be recognized in any presentation.
Piaget and other child-psychologists believe that
the childish form of perception is "syncretistic", and
that "Verbal syncretism" holds also for language, "in a
word, the line of development of language, as of perception,
is from the whole to the part, from syncretism to analysis,
1.
not vice versa. Wo begin by dissociation, not association.
"'^Syncretistic understanding consists precisely in
this, that the whole is understood before the parts are
analyzed, and that the understanding of details takes
place--rightly or wrongly only as a function of the
general schema." Thus in his first essays in comprehend-
ing language symbols, the child lets all the difficult
words in a given phrase slip by, then he connects the
familiar words into a general schema, which subsequently
enables him to interpret the words not originally under-
stood. Needless to say, his schema is not so much logical
as it is psychological.
"childish thought, and ego-centric thought in general,
are perceptually determined by a need for justification
at all costs." * The prevalence of early questions as to
1. piaget, Jean.—The Language and Thought of the Child.
(trans. Marjorie V/arden) . Harcourt, Brace. N.Y. 1926. (p. 13'
^' Ibid. (p. 145).

•why this or that?' is merely the quest for a causal
justification that the child seeks in the ordering of
external affairs. It is affective, thus, rather than
intellectual in cliaracter. Piaget calls this tendency of
the mind to link all juxtaposed experience in the relation
of cause and effect, "Precausality". "The child, thanks
to the notion of Pr ecausality, conceives the world as
more logical than it is really. This makes him believe
it possible to connect everything and to foresee every-
thing, and the assumptions which he makes are endowed in
his eyes with a richness in possible deductions which our
adult logic could never allow them to possess."
The child's pragmatic attitude toward speech, his
verbal intentionalism, as Piaget calls it, gives rise
to two fundamental categories or primitive functions ^f
thought: the explicatory, and the implicatory. The ex-
plicatory function is centrifugal, i.e. from the intention
it seeks to draw out the material consequence, resultant
act or event (explain causality, etc.). The implicatory
function is centripetal, i.e. from the intention it seeks
to trace back to the directing motive or idea (or delve
for the logical relationships that classify his world).
These mysteries of psychological development seem to
Rignano and Bertrand Russell to be all reducible to the
_power of memory. Rignano says, "in order to account for
^' Ibid. (p. 212).
^'
" (p. 234).
f
the most fundamental biological and psychological mani-
festations of life it is sufficient to suppose that there
exists in nervous energy, over and beyond the properties
common to all the energies of the inorganic world, nothing
more than the mnemonic property . . .This mnemonic faculty may
be defined as the capacity of reproducing, through internal
causes, the specific physiological states which primarily
required for their production the action of forces of the
external world. Russell phrases it thus: "...the law
of habit is adequate to account for the use of words in
2.
the absebce of their objects."
The whole problem of the acquisition of language
of the meaning of words in the child-mind is still vague.
But it is certain that inattention on our part to the way
in which they understand words is the root of early mis-
conceptions that influence all their lives.
Thorndike, from the point of view of the educational
psychologist, analyzes the process of understanding a
paragraph: "Sacg word tends to call up responses which
are bound to it be the pupil »s past experience working
under the conditions of the present mental set. Of these
responses, some may be discarded from thought as soon as
they appear. The one that is left as the determiner of
meaning may be right or wrong, or one that contributes
^* Rignano,E. --The Psychology of Reasoning, (trans. Vi/inifred
Holl). Earcourt, Brace. N.Y. 1925. (pp. 588-90).
p
Russsll, Bertr and. --The Analysis of Mind. London. Allen
and Unwin. New York. Macmillan. 1921. (p. 206?).

zero meanirxg (such as the mere approximate sound of the
word to a child who has never heard it used). For the
meaning attached to a word to be » right* means to "be right
for the purpose of understanding the paragraph to be
adapted to the meanings of the other v/ords. Tendencies
for words to call up universally wrong meanings, or mean-
ings right in other connections but wrong here, have to
be suppressed. These contributory elements of meaning have
to be felt in the right relations. The relations are in-
dicated by the relational v;ords, by the order of words in
the paragraph, and by the word-forms and sentence-structure.
"The bonds leading from relational words, word-orders,
and word- forms to the appropriate responses are often not
so strong as they need to be for correct reading. There
are consequently tendencies for the non-relational v;ords
to call up their customary relations, even though the
conjunctions and sentence-structure show that these eub-
tomary relations do not hold in the paragraph in question.
The contributory tendencies of each word and word-group
have to be right, not only in nature, but also in their
amounts of potency or influence or force, each in com-
parison with the others. Under stnnding is 'thinking
things together'. For each problem of understanding, the
elements have to be organized in a balanced system. The
-complexity of this task is ^reat in reading even a simpl^a
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sentence. So the commonest cause of errors in the material
we have examined is the under -potency or over-potency of
certain elements. It is this task which shov/s the com-
prehension of text-books and lectures to be far above the
level of merely passive or 'receptive' work..."
Two other recent studies of pupil-comprehension in
language have revealed a deficiency which is rarely sus-
2.pected by adults or exactly diagnosed by teachers. Irion
ejialyzing recent aims in literature-teaching, finds that
the tendency is to make teaching merely an enticement to
read. Underlying this are the assumptions (1) that pupils'
lack of appreciation is due to class-procedure and not
to lack of linguistic ability, (2) that the pupil has
the literary comprehension to master the selections sug-
gested for use, 8-nd (3) that (by the time he reaches the
9th grade) the pupil is master of the reading process to
the extent that if left to his own devices, he will choose
to read and will enjoy doing so. Irion devised a number
of tests, and as a result of their application, comes to
the conclusion that "the average reading comprehension
as compared with the total comprehension-possibilities
of the selections used, is so mediocre that it is very
hazardous to proceed on the assumption that students in
the 9th grade can read well enough to comprehend and ap-
preciate literature merely by reading."
^' Thorndike,E.L. --Understanding of Sentences. Elementary
School Journal. October. 1917.
^' Iri©n, Theodore. --Comprehension Difficulties of 9th Grade
Students in the Study of Literature. No. 189. Teachers'
College Contribution to Education. 1925. Columbia Univ. N.Y.
Teachers' College Bureau of Publications.
c
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The other study lists six sources of error in the
1.
reading comprehension of children:
(1) material requiring simple mathematical calculations.
(2) prepotent factors (cf. Thorndike, above),
(3) conditional clauses. (Failure to subordinate properly).
(4) sentences too compact or involved.
(5) material containing ideas not clearly stated, but implied.
(6) tendency to make guesses, instead of reasoning carefully.
But such studies, while they draw attention to a def-
iciency too little noted, do not reach dov/n to an analysis
of the real sources of confusion in language. They indicate
gaps in the theory of teaching language-comprehension, but
have nothing to say of the deceptions that language may
practice upon mature and immature alike.
*
A great effort is made by adults to impart to children
hhe common currency of words. This is necessary for the
primary controls of society. But after a certain time, or
stage, "when the individual has become fairly competent,
the pressure of the need to \inderstand ever more and more
finely relaxes. Errors and failures no lomger entail the
penalty of being left out. Nor are they so easily exposed.
A child of eight is constantly made to feel that he is not
understanding something. At eighteen he may misunderstand
^* Carroll, Robt. P.—An Experimental Study of Comprehension
in Reading. No. 245. Teachers^, College Contributions to
Education. Bureau of Pub. Tea. Coll. Columbia U. N.Y. 1926.
I€
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nearly as often, but the testing instance, which makes
Mm realize that this is so, infrequently arises. Unless
either his company or his studies are exceptional, he will
rarely be forced to face any such disagreeable facts. For
he will have acquired enough skill in the reproduction of
more or less appropriate language to disguise most of his
failures, both from the v/orld and from himself. He can
answer questions in a way which may convince everybody,
himself included, that he understands them. He may be able
to translate difficult passages with every sign of dis-
cernment, write passable essays, and conuerse with great
apparent intelligence upon many subjects, let in spite
of these acqultements, he may be making at innumerable
points what Mr. Russell once called » a purely prudentifel
use of language'. That is, he may be using words not be-
cause he knows with any precision v\diat he means by them,
but because he knows how they are ordinarily used, and
does with them what he has heard other people do with
them before.
"
Thus the thorniness of the path to meaning-comprehension
is indicated by studies of ethnography and child-psychology.
We turn next to the linguistic science of Meaning, or Sem-
antics, to note the fluidity of meaning, and to gain a
perspective on single words that will aid our interpreta-
tion of language as a whole.
t; —
Richards, I. A. --Practical Criticism. Harcourt, Brace.
New York. 1930. (p. 324).
f
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CHAPTER III
Meaning in Semantics
4
The word "Semantics is derived from the Greek
^^f^^/uei)/f to signify, and was first employed by Michel
Brdal, in a rath&r broad sense, as the Science of Signifi-
cations in language, as opposed to Phonetics, the Science
of Sounds. "l propose to study. ...the intellectual causes
which have influenced the transformation of our languages."
According to Carnoy, this "collection of separate
studies has to do with all branches of linguistics except
the study of sounds and their history". Since we are in-
terested only in those facts or lav/s which may illumine
our use of word-meanings in thinking, and have no inten-
tion of introducing purely philological matter, we can
review rather summarily the contributions of Br^al.
Part II of his book, on "How the Meaning of words is
Determined", is more strictly Semantics. "Languages are
condemned to a perpetual lack of proportion between the
Word and the Thing. " Restriction and expansion of meaning
are the commonest results of this disproportion. The
latter often results from changes in history. (Pecunia
meant originally 'wealth in cattle and stock'. '«Yhen wealth
was later measured in other terms, the word persisted with
1. Br^al, Michel. --Semantics : Studies in the Science of Meaning.
(trans. Mrs. Henry Cust). London. Heinemann. 1900. (p. 5).
r
an expanded significance, as » money »•
"Language reserves one satisfaction for the observer,
...of feeling a metaphor, whose value has hitherto not
been understood, suddenly open and reveal itself. Thus
we establish a secret harmony between our own thought and
the ancient inheritance of speech." ^* Such words as
ponder . rectitude , levity , and crook (villain), contain
metaphor of homely good sense. Thus thought implies
weighing, ideal conduct does not deviate, etc. It is well
to know that a vast percentage of our more abstract terms
originated in the metaphorical use of more concrete acts
and objects. Thus it is apparent that the language of
science is not' less metaphorical than is that of poetry.
Conversely, we have a Concretion of (abstract) Meaning.
Prom the "action of enjoyment" (fruor) we get the word
"fruit", etc.
The phenomena of multiplication of meanings from a
single origin is labelled "polysemia". The word " root "
is an example. The context usually (save in puns) pre-
vents ambiguity. This will be taken up in our later
study of Interpretation. But Brdal did not carry his an-
alysis far enough, nor systematize his "science".
After a number of years during which Semantics lan-
' guished, either vulgarized, or set deep in the esoteric
• Ibid. (p. 129)
> f
recesses of philology, a revitalized treatment of the
subject was presented by uarnoy, in 1927,
It is a question, says Carnoy, of words and ideas not
as found in language, which is composed of sentences, but
of associations existing in the memory between certain
symbols and certain ideas, these associations being merely
"virtual", and actualizing themselves in the phrases where
they are put to work. This science, which is to be dis-
tinguished not only from lexicology, but also from grammar,
syntax, stylistic, and phonetics, which deals with sounds,
has received the name of Semantics, or Semasiology,
And Semantics is not only an aspect of Linguistics,
but also a branch of Symbolics, in the widest sense of
that word. For words are symbols which interest our minda
not so much for themselves as by reason of some other
/ 2.image or notion which they ijjtroduce by association/
A symbol is a si^n that is fairly well installed.
Thus a grunt of warning may be a sign, adapted by the
hearer to the situation. But it is not a symbol in the
full sense, a symbol being a sign that has become habit-
ually linked in a certain relation, so that the idea it
intends is reached less by the hazard of the particular
situation than by the established mechanism agreed upon
for communication.
Carnoy, A. --La Science du Mot--Trait4 de S^mantique. (p.
* Ibid. Adapted from Carnoy by the writer.
f*
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Complex groups of ideas can be represented by a single
sign, and thus still more comprehensive syntheses of thought
can be manipulated, for it is sufficient for a speaker to
apprehend merely the direction of the idea toward which
the sign orients him, without calling up all the n-umberless
images and notions linked with each symbol in memory. As
Horne Tooke phrased it, words are the abbreviations for thing
1.
This fact was remarked also by Ferrero, from another
angle. He recognized the importance to Psychology of "Sym-
bols of Reduction". We never perceive all the elements in
a field of vision. In a prairie we do not note all the blades
of grass, etc. Tourgenieff » s aesthetic theory of description
was based on this trait of selection. According to him, a
description was all the more perfect if it limited itself to
seize and reproduce the characteristic detail which by itself
could conjure up the whole complex image of the scene to the
mind. And the question of "fetiches" in both ethnology and
abnormal psychology hinges upon the selective vision.
The process of comprehending all signification has three
levels: (1) perceptual , the primary impact of the image; (2)
affective , the impression, agreeable or not, which accom-
panies the apperception; (5) conceptual . the specific intel-
lectual sentiment which awakens more or less clearly upon
presentation of the symbol; also the set of the will, etc.,
Ferrero, Guglielmo. --Les Lois Psychologiques du Symbolisme
Paris, Felix Alcan. 1895.
{\
toward producing the reaction corresponding to the idea.
The science of signification is hased on the existence
of these three aspects of word-sense.
^'
The ways in which words become linked up by association
in the mind have been suggestively listed by another
p ^
French linguist, using the word "enseignement " as example
(1) Words referring to the same mental preoccupation. (
(^ducateur, apprendre, Scole, Sl^ve, etc.)
(2) Terms for parallel ideas, (justice, defense nationale)
.
(3) Other forms of the idea, grammatical association.
(j'enseigne, enseignez, etc.).
(4) Words of same phonetic elements, (renseigner, etc.).
(5) Words expressing the same aspect under which the idea
presents itself, (armement, entr ainement
,
etc.).
(6) phonetic association by rhyme, regardless of sense.
(justement, assommant, etc.).
(7) Expressions evoking similar sensations, (effort, in-
t6r^t , etc
.
)
.
Consideration of the diverse association-strands
will throw light on the origin of certain words. Sometimes
the emergence of an association will coincide with the
utterance of a word, and wrest it into a new, composite
form. Thus shimmer is the synthesis of shine and p:limme.r. .
.1 ounc
e
is the synthesis of .jump and bounce .
t; : ; :
Ibid. (p. 43).
2
' De Saussure. —Cours de Linguistlque G^n^rale. Lausanne.
1916. (p. 181 ff,).
c
The fact that words develop affinities with each
other is shown in the ready formation of styles" of
utterance. Carnoy distinguishes, for the French, (1) the
noble, or literary; (2) the normal; (3) the familiar, or
trivial: (4) the vulgar: (5) the ironic slang; (6) the
1.
rude, scurrilous, or defamatory. Theories of Inter-
pretation must bear some such distinctions in mind. Many
are the confusions that arise from disparate "realms of
discourse" clashing fruitlessly.
In the second part of his treatise, Carnoy studies
and classifies the types of changes in word-meanings.
He calls such change "Metasemla", a term current among
philologists. He constructs on this basis a uniformly
formidable terminology for all the subdivisions. We
may turn next to consider the more important classes
established by him.
The major division arises from the fact that changes
of meaning fall into two heads: either they are the result
of gradual and unconscious modifications, or they are the
result of a sudden and fortuitous substitution which
finds acceptance in time. The latter he calls Diasemia«
The former, the Evolutive type of change, is sub-
divided into simple and complex Metasemia#

In Simple Metasemla, Carnoy notes three main varieties
of change! (1) gliding (met-ondo-seraia) , a simple shift
from one of the several elements connoted by a word to
another, a change in the dominant connotation. This is
the most unconscious and mechanical phenomenon in Seman-
tics, (ex. clever ^ whose dominant connotation was intel -
ligent . comes to signify good-natured ; or a boat can be
manned by girls . though man was once the dominant notion)
•
(2) ft-x-t-.«^nsl on or rpstT'l f>t1 on of meaning (ecsemia, prosemia)
.
(ex. vignettes . once designs featuring vine-tendrils, etc.,
now any decorative design of a dainty sort; whereas corn ,
generically any seed of a cereal-grass, is restricted to
Indian corn in the U.S.A., to wheat in England, and to
oats in Scotland.)
(3) ^ T'T'P^rii' ahl on of meaning, of three sorts: (a) ideas
r^oymally accompanying (perisemia). (ex. bureau , first a
tatole covered with bure, a woolen stuff, next the office
which contains it, then the personnel thereof, etc.).
(b) ideas essentially dependent (aposemia). (ex. a glass .
coming to signify the contents ) . and (c) ideas of entities
associated with the action or quality ( amphisemia) . (ex,
exposition , first the action of exposing something, then
the display itself, as an entity).
This last-mentioned type is important to a theory of
Interpretation. Which of the two meanings intended in any
(0
particular case is often ambiguous. A lack of distinction
is responsible for what is called the TJtraquistic Subterfuge,
which muddies a lot of metaphysical thought.
In Complex Metasemia, Carnoy makes three main div-
isions, also. { eomplex changes are changes due to the
reciprocal influences of words on each other by association.)
(1) dissimilation (antisemia), the tendency to fix notions
by their contrast or opposition to others, (ex. bourgeois .
which has a different signification according to its con-
trast with rustic ^ with laborer j with noble , or with
artist- Intellectual . Its principle use in this country is
in contradistinction to radical . )
(2) assimilation (homosemia) , the tendency to give an
identical value to symbols which merely resemble each
other in form (phonetic homosemia) or in meaning (semantic
homosemia). (ex. standard borrows much signification from
stand, though derived from the French ^tendard . "that
which is extended, flag"; plain and homely , once merely
simple, home-like , domestic . now signify ugly .
)
(3) contagion (sysemia), changes due to the habitual
juxtaposition of words in a phrase, either (a) simple , or
abbreviated (brachysemia) , or (b) with effacement of the
meaning, (ex. arch- is sly^ from association with demon s
bri l 7 i ant .q is abbreviated for brilliant gems ; good as
* Ogden and Richards. Op. cit. (p. 239).

a mere formula of salutation)
•
These are the classes of meaning-change in Carnoy's
Evolutive Metasemia, the result of unconscious modifi-
cations. We glance next at the classes of meaning- change
which are the result of sudden and conscious substitutions,
which he labels Diasemia. One of the characteristics of
diasemic language is that it strives more for effect than
for exact comprehension. It seeks novelty, is contagious,
adds 'spiceS niakes language not only a tool, hut a game.
Under Diasemia, or substitutive change, there are again
three main groups. (1) evocative diasemia, changes tending
to stimulate or vivify the vision; (2) appreciative diasemia,
substitutions because of pleasant or unpleasant connotations
attached to certain words. (3) quantitative diasemia, sub-
stitutions of meaning to increase or lessen force of idea.
Within the first group, avocativfi substitutions, he
notes three further divisions: (1) eoisemia , the desig-
nation of concepts by their most picturesque or striking
determinants, (ex. skv-pilot for minLaiiLii; howler . for
laughable mistake : keep the pot boiling , for support home
.
)
(2) parasemia , the substitution, for the normal term, of
another belonging to a notion of the same order, (ex. in
affective parasemia : carcass for b ody : phiz for face :
_
moisture, for sweat ; in extensive parasemia ; weed , for

tob acco ; thing , matter . for the most diverse faots or
tnft-hi ons . (paiisemia) ; in typosemia . use of types: Jew ,
for bnrgalnQi* . Adonis . for handsome vouth^ •
(3) metecsemia ,
(
metaphor ) , the presentation of an idea
by the intermediary of a more intuitive notion belonging
to another domain. Metaphors are classed as: perceptual .
(ex. cocoanut for head ^ : synaesthetic . ( ox. sharp sound ,
dark, brown taste ) : affective . (ex. treasure ^ for someone
loved ) : or pragmatic . (ex. swallow an affront )
»
pour further types of metaphorical "projection" ^are
sketched under this heading of Evocative Diasemia:
(a) anasemia . a transfer, by analogy, from the material
to the immaterial, (ex. to grasp . meaning to comprehend ,
and comprehend is itself an example of this type in Latin).
(b) tech-nical borrowing's , (ex. to drift, for stroll lazily )
.
(c) zoosemda . the transfer from human or inanimate, to
animal sphere, (ex. to dog a person, for to fol 1 ow iiim.
)
(d) anthr op osemi
a
.
the transfer from animal or inanimate,
to human sphere, (ex. the stfirs thr ow dovm their spears )
.
Under Appreciative Diasemia are distinguished:
(1) euphem.lsm , (eusemia) . (ex. the departed^ for the dead)
»
(2) (^yfirliftinlfiin, (dyssemia) . (ex. gunboats . for fihOftfi)
.
Under Quantitative Diasemia are distinguished:
m
(1) hyperbola , (hypersemia) . (ex. Dosltivelv killing ,
for very amusing ^
•
(2) hvposemia , suggestive attenuations through:
(a) litotes . (ex. that's going some.').
(b) irony , (ex. Snow Ball as a negro name),
(also oxymoron (ex. a rich beggar ^ : and
cacophemv
.
vituperative endearment.)
(c) enigma ( cryptosemia) . (ex. there ' s nobody home
^
speaking of someone either insane or dull)
•
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The above may serve to summarize, though rather too
briefly for immediate clarity, a systematic perspective
on word-meaning changes. We find here an approach, from
a different angle than that to which our schooling had
accustomed us, to many phenomena usually scattered in
grammars, rhetoric and style texts, and the researches
of etymologists. But the facts grouped here all have to
do with our inquiry into Meaning in language. Words that
fall v/ithin these categories are the components of our
daily efforts to use language, and it is well to knov;
that, as separate counters of intellectual or affective
currency, their values are amazingly flexible, even shifting
V/e may turn next to consider theories of Symbolism,
and the interpretation of the larger 1 anguage c ont^xt s
•
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CHAPTER IV
Meaning in Theories of Symbolism
"Symbolism is the study of the part played in hiiman
affairs by language and symbols of all kinds, and especially
of their influence on Thought. It singles out for special
inquiry the ways in which symbols help us and hinder us
in reflecting on Things."
Everyone has had the experience of repeating a word
into monotony of meaninglessness, and has felt the twinge
of involuntary horror that comes with realizing that he
has so easily severed the bond between the word and what
it means. But for most of us, this is enough experimenting.
Conventional acceptations resume their sway, and we do not
bother to inquire into the mystery of meaning.
Meaning gives value to the symbol. Poets, preoccupied
with values, seek always for the finer nuances of meaning
that make one word more effective than another, until they
are led to question all the fabrications of their art.
The answer of Hamlet, on being asked what he was reading:
"V/ords, v/ords, v/ords,'' is invested, paradoxically, with
a significance that is at once profound and tragic. The
masks of words or symbols can be as empty or as full as
the masks of faces that make up our human world. T.S.Eliot
^' Ogden, Charles Kay, and Richards, Ivor Armstrong. —The
Meaning of Meaning. A Study of the Influence of Language
upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism. Harcourt,
Brace & Co. Hew York. 1923.

says in a poem, "There will be time, there will be time,
to prepare a face to meet the faces that you meet,"
and this, too, indicates that meaning is relative to
the perceiving subject, and ultimately inviolable.
It is not to be wondered, then, that in all ages
have arisen certain very intense minds, which have felt
it their destiny to burn their way through the carapace
that hides significance from them. Nor is it to be won-
dered that the complete mystics have repudiated the tools
of language shaped for the service of action, and have
had recourse only to the most figurative symbols, which
might suggest, but could not describe, an inner revelation.
The sceptical treatment accorded to the mystic state
by modern psychology, v/hich says, in fine, that we have
here nothing but an abnormal condition of the organism,
does not detract from the realization that emerges here,
one which is felt by all thoughtful educators: there are
insights, perspectives, v/hich are utterly incommunicable,
(despite a possible expr essibility in language), and which
are only attainable at the cost of undergoing a long series
of experiences similar to those that built up the necessary
context to give significance to the wisdom in question.
A certain pseudo-mysticism has given rise to a use
of the term "symbolism" that does not fall within the
confines of our present study. I refer to the S^'mboliste
c
group of poets, primarily French, v;hose common ground was
an exploitation of words as cryptograms, to symbolize matters
lurking in the subconscious psyche of the race. This usage
is related to that of the psychoanalysts after Freud, who
treat of dream elements, etc., as symbolizations of the
Unconscious, to be translated into consciousness to ease
the inner tension. And this usage, in turn, is linked
with the study of Religious Symbolism, with all of its
powerful suasions over the human mind. The cross, for ex-
ample, is a symbol capable of the most varied interpreta-
tions, as its fortunes are traced down the ages. But we
are here considering only the current language- symb ols
.
* -sc-
In order to attain a broad perspective on the subject
of Meaning, we turn to consider certain theories of Sym-
bolism, which present a foundation for subsequent inter-
pretation of meanings. V»'e must delve into the psychology
of language and of thought. Our chief authorities here
will be Ogden and Richards, whose study of Symbolism
is divested of all metaphysical assumptions.
To indicate the actual relation between Word, Thought,
and Thing, a diagram is given:
6
Here the indirectness of the relation between Words
and Things is the most important feature to be noted. It
is indicated by the dotted line of the base of the tri-
angle. The Word, or Symbol, symbolizes a Thought, or Ref-
erence, which in turn refers to its Object, or Referent.
By using the terms Reference and Referent, we discriminate
between what the Word symbolizes, and v/hat the Thought
points to. "Between the Symbol and the Referent there is
no relation other than the indirect one, which consists
1.
in its being used by someone to stand for a Referent."
Standing for, and representing, are different relations.
When, for grammatical reasons a direct relation between
Symbol and Referent is implied, it will merely be an im-
puted, as opposed to a real, relation.
The simplification, common in language, which over-
looks the indirectness of this relation is the source of
1.
Ogden and Richards. Op cit. (p. 16).

almost all the difficulties which thought encounters.
Meaning is not some quality inhering in the object, in
spite of the convenient shorthand of the term, which seems
so self-evident and habitual, just as Ptolemaic cosmology
once did»
Discussing the primitive attitude toward words, which
has persisted, and still runs rife in the metaphysical
aspects of our thinking, the authors show how the virord
comes at last to take the place of the thought quite
completely, (producing a reflex action), and they quote
Kignano, who likens the process to the shedding ofl the
carapace by a crustacean: "?/ithout this verbal carapace,
the disp-ppearance of a^.! intellectual content would in-
volve the disappearance of all trace of the past existence
of such content • But the carapace preserves something
which, just because it proves the past existence of a
concept which formerly had a real life, may quite well
be taken for one still existing. So that this something,
although devoid of all intellectual content, always con-
stitutes a valuable point of attachment and support for
the corresponding emotion, which is so Intense that it
does not perceive that the cherished resemblances no
longer clother the beloved object."
Ibid. (p. 91).

In Chapter III, the authors advance a Theory of signs,
i.e. of what happens when we think of anything. Rejecting
the traditional view that a relation of some unique sort
is involved, they outline an account of thinking in purely
causal terms "without any introduction of unique relations
invented ad hoc.
"
"All experience, in the widest sense, is either en-
joyed or interpreted (treated as a sign), or both, and
very little escapes some degree of interpretation. An ac-
count of the process of Interpretation is thus the key
to understanding the sign- situat ion. ., .When we strike a
match, the movements we make and the sound of hhe scrape
are present stimuli. But the excitation which results is
different from what it would be had we never struck matches
before. Past strikings have left, in our organization,
engr ams , residual traces (of an adaptation made by the
organism to a stimulus) which help to determine what the
mental process will be, i.e. an awareness that we are
striking a match. If this awareness is accompanied by
an expectation of a flame, the expectation again will be
due to the engraphic action of situations in which the
striking of a match has been followed by a flame... The
expectation is the excitation of part of an engr am- complex,
which is called up by a stimulus (the scrape) similar to
'.?ton University
r.ool of Education
Library ^
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a part only of the original stimulus-situation. .
.
"We will suppose that the match ignites and that we
have been expecting a flame. In this case the flame is
what we are adapted to. ^^ore fully, the expectation (a
process) is similar to processes which have been caused
by flames in the past, aricl further , it is 'directed to»
the future.... Besides being 'directed to' the future,
our expectation is also 'directed to' flame. But here
'directed to' stands for nothing more than 'similar to
what has been caused by'. A thought is directed to
flame when it is similar in certain respects to thoughts
which have been caused by flame. . . The suggestion that
to say 'I am thinking of A' is the same thing as to say
'My thought is being caused by A' will shock every right
minded person; and yet when for 'caused' we substitute
an expanded account, this strange suggestion will be
foimd to be the solution....
"if we recognize (in using 'cause') the fact that
experience has the character of recurrence, i.e. comes
to us in more or less uniform contexts, we have in this
all that is required for the Theory of Signs.... Inter-
pretation is only possible thanks to these recurring
contexts. (A psychological context is a recurrent set of
mental events peculiarly related to one another so as to
recur, as regards their main features, with partial

uniformity. . .The members of it may be indefinitely
numerous and may be widely separated in time, and it is
through this separateness in time that such a psycho-
logical context is able to link together external con-
texts, which are recurrent sets of experiences of a
physical nature).
'*If now there be an event which completes the ex-
ternal context in question, the reference is true and
the event (flame) is its referent. .True and false be-
liefs are members of the s«une kinds of psychological
contexts, and they differ only in respect of external
contexts. . . All beliefs , whether true or false , are
theoretically analyzable into compounds whose constitu-
ents are simple references . either definite or indefinite ,
united by the relations which give its 'logical form» to
the reference. .
.
"Thus if we say 'This is a book» and are in error,
our reference will be composed of a simple indefinite
reference to any book, another to anything now, another
to anything which may be here, and so on. These constit-
uents will all be true, but the whole reference to this
book which they together make up (by cancelling out, as
it were, all but the one reference which can be a book
and here and now) will be false, if we are in error and
what is there is actually a box or something which fails
re
to complete the three contexts, book, here, and now."
"to make a statement is to symbolize a reference...
However much we may try, we cannot go beyond reference
in the way of knowledge. True reference is reference to
a set of referents as they hang together, false reference
is reference to them as being in some other arrangement
than that in which they actually hang together .. .By no
manner of make-believe can we discover the what of ref-
erents (objects). We can only discover the how...,"
Thus, where we find one of the old and famous para-
doxes, bad symbolization is indicated, and we must
pand the peccant symbol until we discover the ambiguous
sign-situation which caused the trouble.
At the basis of all successful communication are
certain postulates or regulative presumptions, called
by Ogden and Richards the Canons of Symbolism, the
ignoring of which brings confusion. I give them below,
with briefly curtailed explanations:
I. One Symbol stands for one and only one Heferent.
(This referent may be complex, of course. The canon
guards against what we called in Semantics "polysemia",
i,e. one word with several meanings is really as msmy
words as there are meanings.)
/
II. Symbols which can be substituted one for another
symbolize the same reference.
(The two symbols 'The King of England* and 'The
Owner of Buckingham Palace' have the same referent, but
do not symbolize the same reference . and for more rigor-
ous purposes thsin general discussion they are not,
strictly speaking, substitutes for each other.)
III. The referent of a contracted symbol is the referent
of that symbol expanded.
(The first thing to do when a disputed symbol is
encountered is to expand it, if possible, to its full
form. Incidentally here we stumble up against the un-
certainty, everywhere arising, as to the level of in-
terpretation, or reference, on which we are symbolizing,
i.e. the relative refinement or discrimination of the
interpretative process. "Both contraction and pseudo-
expansion result in peopling the universe with spurious
entities, the mistaking of symbolic machinery for refer-
ents, as for example Univer sals. ")
.
IV. A symbol refers to what it is actually used to refer
to; not necessarily to what it ought in good usage, or
is intended by an Interpreter, or is intended by the
user to refer to.
("Normally, whenever we hear anything said, we
I
spring to the conclusion. . .that the speaker is referring
to what we should be referring to were we speaking the
words our selves. .. .But in most discussions which attempt
greater subtleties than could be handled in a gesture
language, this will not be so." Thus, individual vari-
ations need to be corrected by a Canon of Actuality).
V. No complex symbol may contain constituent symbols
which claim the same 'place*.
(e.g. a symbol of form cannot have mutually exclusive
parts, cannot place roundness and squareness together).
VI. All possible referents together form an order, such
that every referent has one place only in that order.
(This canon covers the three Aristotelian Laws of
Thought: A is A; A is not not-A; A is either B or not B;
And a place and its 'referent' are the same.)
Still postponing our analysis of the current types
of meaning, let us turn to consider the preliminary
problem of how we define. A definition is arbitrary and
cannot deny the possibility of other definitions; yet we
may expect to find a number of co-ordinates commonly
used in the siir^ler cases.
1.
The definition, sa^rs Adler, "being interpretative,
does not assert what a thing is, but rather what it means.
1.
Adler, M.J. --Op. cit. (p. 220).
r
To define a thing is not to say what it is, but what it
is conceived to be. . .To fail to perceive this disparity
between the possible nature of anything and its definition
is to give unlimited right and power to the practice of
calling names.... A commoner error would be to suppose
that the definition indicates, not what the defined is,
but what it should be. Names are very often used in this
manner of moral legislation over things; if they are not
what they are called, at least they should be. This error
may be avoided if the process of definition be clearly
understood as having both denotative and connotative force."
Portunatiiy, the types of fundamental connections
with which discussions are concerned are few in niomber,
and we can frame a list of them. ''All possible refer eqtH
are connected in one or other, or several, of these
fundamental ways with referents which we can all succeed
in identifying. And we must select our starting points
with reference ;^to the particular universe of discourse
in which our 'definienda» fall. Thus if we wish to indi-
cate what we are referring to when we use the word
»Beauty», we shoudl proceed by picking out certain
starting-points, such as nature, pleasure, emotion, or
truth, and then saying that what we refer to by 'Beauty*
is anything lying in a certain relation (imitating nature,
causing pleasure or emotion, revealing truth) to these points
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1. Symbol izatIon . The simplest way of defining, by indic-
ating an entity to which the word can refer.
2. Similarity * Defining by stating the likeness of the
required referent to an indicated referent. (To this we
may add the contrasting definition by Oppositeness, as
was suggested in our study of Semantic Theory. Defining
hy opposites is rarely sufficient by itself unless the
opposite is well 'placed'. A peculiarity is often noted
here, that such definition often serves to bestow a re-
ciprocal clarification upon the two terms located thus
in respect to each other).
3. ?^pfltial Relations . Defining by location relative to
known referents in space. (In, on, between, bigger than).
4. Temporal Relations . As in (3), for known referents in
Time, (before, after, just as, etc.).
5. Caus at i on ; Phys i c al . e.g. 'sawdust' is what is produced by...
dreams, etc.
7. Causation tPsvcho-Physical . e.g. 'A perception of orange*
is the effect in consciousness of certain vibrations fal-
ling on the retina.
8. Beinff: the Qb.iect of ^ Ment al State , e.g. 'piteous' things
are those toward which we feel pity.
9. G.ommon eoiqplex Relations . Definitions by two or more of above.
10. Legal Relations , e.g. 'belonging to', etc.
e.g. the Unconscious causes
c
Beyond such a practical list of routes of definition,
there have of course been erected other and stricter
formulae to give the necessary rigidity to terms for
special systems. But for the less systematized (and usu-
ally more interesting) sciences, a different attitude
toward definition is both desirable and necessary, "in
aesthetics, politics, psychology, sociology, etc., the
stage of systematic symbolization with its fixed and un-
alterable definitions has not been reached." In Education,
the like may be observed. No system of terminology, though
it enjoy its day of fashion, that does not slight some
aspects which a new messiah will emphasize in the pen-
dular progress toward 'science". Not by rejecting a rival
nomenclature is understanding brought about, but by tracing
it to common ground.
"But far more important than these is the instinctive
attitude to words as natural containers of power, which
has, from the dawn of language,been assumed by mankind,
and is still supported and encouraged by all the earlier
stages of education.
"The correction for this persistent tendency is a
greater familiarity with the more common routes of def-
inition, and a lively sense, which might easily be awakened
as a part of education, that our use of any given word
.1:0 stand for our referent on any occasion, is not due
I
60.
to any peculiar fitness of the word for that particular
referent, but is determined by all sorts of odd accidents
of our own history* V/e ought to regard communication as
a difficult matter, and close correspondence of reference
for different thinkers as a comparatively rare event. It
is never safe to assume that it has been secured unless
both the starting points and the routes of definition,
whereby the referents of at least a majority of the sym-
bols employed have been reached, are known.* "''*
"'ififhere there is reason to suppose that a slippery
term is being employed, it is a wise policy to collect
as wide a range of uses as possible, without at this stage
seeking for a common element* Then relate these to the
routes of reference. Vrfhat is required is that each def-
inition should unmistakably mark out a certain range of
referents. Common or ' essential » elements may not ryn
through all the respectable uses of a word, as any lin-
guist knows, and therefore a selection of »the* essential
meaning is more often than not arbitrary."
If, then, we can locate the desired idea in its
proper province, the accident of language that has caused
the idea to share a single word-habitation with a number
of other ideas will no longer confuse us*
*
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Ogden and Richards. Op.cit. (p. 225).
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leaning, as applied to language- symb ols , has most
commonly been taken as self-evident by those who used
the word, philosophers no less than laity. i:et its uses
turn out, on scrutiny, to be varied indeed. C.W. Morris
notes a "duality of reference in the modern use of the
term. ..due to the inclusion of both signification (i.e.
action of making known) and significance (i.e. quality
or state of meaningfulness) under the general rubric of
meaning." Baldwin attempts still further distinction
within the word: "..the present psychic value of an object,
its immediate given character, is then supplemented
through its establishment in the outer world; this gives
it characteristic meaning. So we have, first, a system
of data of simple apprehension, first-things of present-
ation; and second, the same system as being referred to,
meant, or intended, that is, as embodying meanings. . .vVe
are aware of importing into the object some meaning due
to our temporary or otherwise special interest, 'This is
what I now mean or intend*." Later he distinguishes
Recognitive and Selective meanings. In commenting on
the latter, he says, "The reduction of the stimulus is
by a process which constructs the object appropriate to
that interest. This is the meaning of psychic selection."
We are here reminded of piaget's concept of "intentional ism"
-J
— ~~~
* Morris, Charles W.--The Concept of the Symbol. Journal of
philosophy, volume 22. (p. 157-91).
^•nBaldwin, James Mark. --Thought and Things, A Study of the
Development and Meaning of Thought, or Genetic Logic.
Macmillan & Co. New York. 1906. (Vol.1, pp. 130-224).

in the child, (see p. 29), and Malinowski's comment on
selective traits in the savage mind and speech. Selective
meaning is also the dominant note in logical abstraction.
The object of words, according to Edward Johnson, was
to wake up an appropriate cluster of sensations in the
memory, "The meaning of a word, therefore, is that sensa-
tion(s) which is brought to the recollection of a man
when he hears that word pronounced. .. In order to transfer
to the word the meaning which is in the speaker »s mind,
it is necessary that the word should be associated with
the same (or very similar) sensations in the mind of the
hearer with which it is associated in the mind of the speaker
Still another aspect is brought out by Eaton, who writes
as a philosopher-epistemologist : "Syntactical meaning
the meaning of the whole determined solely by that of the
parts and their plan of unity can be found in any phrase
sentence, or group of symbols. Its requisites are: (1) a
number of simple symbols referring directly to objects, or
defined in terms of such references; (2) a unity of these
symbols and the intentions which attach to them in a
single intention . It is not necessary that this intention
2
should arise from or terminate in any single object."
Sheffield, in his study of sentence patterns, has
something like this in mind when he says that a "thought"
1. Johnson Edward, Surgeon. --Op. cit. (p. 124)
•
2
Eaton, Ralph M.—Symbolism and Truth. Cambridge. Harvard
University Press. 1925. (p. 37).
i
differs from a mere "idea", or combination of ideas, in
that it satisfies a "concern";... and a complete thought
or what we may call a sentence-thought , is therefore any
idea or group of ideas that is felt as answering to one
impulse of attention. Not its amo\mt of meaning, but its
being felt as directed is what makes it complete." ^*
A dynamic note enters the picture when iiaton says
that "meaning is not a static relation between the mind
and any sort of entity. It is an activity, and this acti-
vity has a direction away from the mind's present content,
whether or not there is a given object (or objective) in
which it terminates. .. It is sufficient, therefore, that
the things which simple symbols mean shall have existed..
A meaning can be carried by an intention alone, and the
2
.
reference does not lose its objective direction." Thus
a devout believer may be convinced that a certain direction
of his feelings outward really "means" a reference to God,
although no entity of any sort may be conceived as being
the terminus of his meaning.
It would be possible to cull further amplifications
and distinctions of the term ''meaning" from various au-
thors, but it will be simpler to turn to the representative
list of the main definitions of Meaning collected by
Ogden and Richards. They have grouped the numbers according
to a conception that will be explained subsequently:
^* Sheffield, Alfred Dwight.—Command of Sentence Patterns.
Scott, poresman. New York. 1929.
p
• Eaton. Op. cit. (p. 154).
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TABLE OP MEANINGS OP iVEANING
(from Ogden and Richards)
A.
I. An Intrinsic property (of the object).
II. A unique unanalyzable Relation to other things.
B.
III. The other words annexed to a word in the Dictionary.
IV. The Connotation of a word (properties implied by lt)»
V. An Essence.
VI» An Activity projected into an object*
VII. (a) An event Intended, (b) a Volition.
VIII. The Place of anything in a system.
IX. The Practical Consequences in our future experience.
X. The Theoretical Consequences involved ot implied by a
statement.
XI. Emotion aroused by anything.
0.
XII. That which is Actually related to a sign by a chosen
relation.
XIII. The Mnemlc effects of a stimulus. Associations acquired.
or (b) Some other occurrence to which the mnemic
effects of any occurrence are Appropriate.
That which a sign is Interpreted as being of.
What anything suggests.
In the case of symbols.
That to which the user of a symbol actually refers.
XIV. That to which the user of a symbol Ought to be referring.
XV* That to which he Believes himself to be referring.
XVI. That to which the Interpreter of a symbol
(a) Refers;
(b) Believes himself to be referring.
(c) Believes the User to be referring.
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Concerning the first two definitions listed in the
table. Intrinsic Property, or Unique Relationship, we
discern a begging of the question that leads to the sus-
picion that the primitive word-superstitions are present.
If we postulate a quality "Meaning", and trust the iden-
tification of it to the magical efficacy of the name,
we are no further advanced than the scholiasts who postu-
lated "'angels" and then discussed how many of these could
dance on the point of a pin. And in the unique, unanilyzable
Relation, moreover, we come upon an ambiguity that is
"utraquistic" , for our grammar leads us to take meaninf
either as standing for the relation between X and Y, when
X means Y, or as standing for Y. This is the "amphisemia"
of Semantics, (see page 41).
The third type. Dictionary Meaning, is among the com-
monest, and is valuable in connection with the proprieties
that are needed for communication. But one of the laws of
Semantics is that synonyms always tend to become differ-
entiated, and are rarely, if ever, perfect. This type of
meaning is connected with Connotation and Good Use. Vv'e
need these uniform standards of comparison to control
the treachery of words; but we must be careful to note
that when we say, "words necessarily mean such-and-such",
we are paving the way for Verbal Magic by the ambiguity;
for "necessary" may suggest the intrinsic possession of
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meaning by words, rather than the fact that a common
meaning is a requisite for communication.
The fourth type, connotation, is reliance upon a con-
venience of language. The connotation is a selection of
properties or adjectives supposed to determine the appli-
cation of a symbol. But "the only entities in the real
world are propertied things which are only symbolically
distinguishable into properties and things." Connotation
breaks down in its application to names, for the proper
name does not connote the 'properties* in virtue of which
it is applied to a person or place.
Essence, (number five), may be considered as an hypo-
statized Connotation. It posits an underlying quality or
substance, and then interprets that unknowable to taste.
Number six, a projected activity, is best explained
in the words of P.C.S/Schiller , who contributed to a
S^piposium on "'The Meaning of MeaaingS. ^* He says,
"We seem at first to have a choice between conceiving it
as (1) an intrinsic property inherent in objects, or (2)
a relation, or (3) as a contribution to reality made by
the subject 5 and each of these ways of treating it may
find support in language. .. Meaning is essentially an
activity or attitude taken up toward objects by a subject,
and energetically projected into them like an alpha-
particle, until they, too, grow active and radiate with Meaning."
^' Mind. October 1920. vol. 29. (pp. 385-414). The other
contributors were Bertrand Russell and H.H. Joachim.
1
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This surrender of Meaning to the vviii has a very great
allure for the poetical thinker. Shakespeare implies it in
"There's nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so",
where meaning involves value of a moral sort. The poet, Schiller
(not the philosopher mentioned above) says, "Know this,
a mind sublime puts greatness into life, yet seeks it not
therein." And Count Keyserling's none too rigorous philo-
sophy of "Significance" makes use of this notion of "bestow-
ing'* meaning. Yet this is merely a striking metaphor to
cover the fact of psycjjic selection, and it conceals the
ranemic causation of this set in the organism. The "engrams"
of past experience dispose the mind to expect certain
elements in a present situation.
Number seven, an Event Intended, or a Volition, is
in common use, as when we say "l mean no harm", or "a
mechanistic universe is without meaning''. When we say
"what I meant was...", there is a confusion, for it may
be expanded either to '*what I intended to refer to", or
"what I did refer to", or even "what I intended you to
refer to". Further attention will be given to tliis element
of discourse when we analyze the language- situation, later.
Unless the referential aspects of Meaning are distinguished
from the affective-volitional aspects, confusion breeds.
Number eight, the place in an ordered system, is
c
allied to a use of the word "Significance". Thus the
meaning, or significance, of the date 1492 is grasped
when we fit it in with what else we know of the circum-
stances bearing on the discovery of America. But such
^ use of Meaning is vague. It can refer back to causes,
or forward to effects, and the system is often a highly
individual thing, 'The meaning of things is determined
by the way they fit into our experiences and purposes...
What does alcohol mean? To one man it suggests the satis-
faction of strong desire; to another it suggests a
wrecked home. Can we expect both to take the same attitude
toward the saloon? .... Only where experiences have been
standardized and made uniform, and where purposes are
also to a considerable degree uniform, can meanings be
.. 1.
the same or very similar to different people."
Numbers nine and ten are current restrictions of eight.
The "Practical Consequences" is the Meaning of the Prag-
matist. '^You cannot define what you mean by calling
statements true, without referring to their functional
possibilities", says William James. * Number ten uses
"means" as synonymous with "involves theoretically", as
in the phrase "You said such-and-such; that means that
you are a pessimist?"
Niimber eleven, the Emotion aroused by anything, is
^* Ellis, S.M.--The Psychology of Individual Differences.
D. Appleton & Co. N.Y. 1928.
p James, Willi am.—The Meaning of Truth. N.Y. Longmans , Green
& Co. (p. 220).

of course, a symbolically unscrupulous use, though it
has its place in Values; such a word as 'God* or 'Love'
has a funded affedtive meaning which is the meaning of
all previous emotional reactions where it has been part
of the psychological context. But it is a bit foolish
to attempt to define an emotiiue usage symbolically, ex-
cept when deflation of misplaced rhapsody is intended.
Number twelve is the definition which emphasizes the
causal relations of events as the Actually occur, vi/hen a
psychologist finds the 'meanings of some mental phenomenon,
what he has found is usually a portion of the cause of it.
Thus a psycho-analyst may say of some apparently innocuous
dream that its meaning is sexual, i.e. that it has been
caused by some condition of the "libido
According to number thirteen, the Mnemic effects, as-
sociations, the meaning of A is that to which the mental
process interpreting A is adapted, or linked in context,
(vide above, page 52). Thus a s3Tnbol becomes when uttered
a sign ( among other things) to the hearer, of an act of
mental reference made by the speaker. But this is more
or less overlooked, for the hearer must, on the basis o f
the sign, make his own reference to the referent, or Thing
for which the word 'stands'. Only when this process is
largely similar in both speaker and hearer can the com-
munication be successful. Symbols usually have one meaning
€t
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for the speaker, another for the hearer.
In a discussion with a friend who knows our personal
idiom, we can progress further than with someone not ac-
customed to our usages. But the consensus of Usage helps
to fiat the elusive symbol. Number fourteen, that to which
the user Ought to be referring, ts the authoritative fix-
ing of meanings desired by the purists. But it should
not be carried to the point, beyond practical discipline,
of believing {with Tooke and Johnson) that words really
have an intrinsic meaning apart from all usage. A review
of the contributions of Semantics to the question of
1.
meaning should strengthen the opposition to the purists.
Often this type of meaning, which may be called Good Use,
is equivalent to Dictionary Meaning, for the substitute-
symbols listed in the dictionary help to lend weight to
this fixing.
Number fifteen, that to which the user Believes himself
to be referring, thaliks to his trust in lihe symbol, is a
precarious type. Any list of schoolboy "boners" will
testify to the prevalence of "malapropisms"
.
And number sixteen, which puts the burden of meaning
on the hearer, as interpreter of either the sign itself
or the speaker's use of it, affords endless opportunities
for misunderstanding. But it is well to recognize that
untrained discourse dabbles into this acceptation of words.
^' An interesting plea for the teaching of the English language
on this more flexible basis, is that of Charles C. Pries , in
the English Journal, January, 1929.
ct
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Language was originally, and still remains to a large
extent, a pragmatic activity. There are two chief functions
it is wont to serve: first, it may be intended to point
out some relationship in the order of things as perceived.
This is the symbolic function, and its simplest method
is the "deictic", (i.e. pointing to); second, it may be
intended, in the absence, or in defiance of, the perceived
order of things, to influence the hearer to feel as we do.
This is the emotive function, found largely in the con-
not at ive values of words.
Often, indeed, we cannot decide which of the two
functions is predominant in any particular use of sym-
bols. Vdptually all the types of metaphor are products
of the emotive use of symbols. Rhetoric is based on this use.
As may be noted in the case of metaphor, so in all
symbols, we seldom have to do with clear-cut functions,
but with the proportionate content of each in a single
symbol. The peculiarity of scientific statement is that
it officially professes to restrict itself to the purely
symbolic function. But many scientists enlist emotitie
symbols for their expositions. And the unsuspected ubiquity
of metaphor may mislead. Adler says, "Metaphorical state-
ments taken in isolation can neither be thoroughly under-
stood nor judged valid or invalid. It is only when they

72.
are interpreted by a contextual environment, although
this itsftlf be metaphorical, that their meaning becomes
clear, and their appropriateness in the given environment
determined. Science furnishes a much more adequate con-
text for its metaphors than does poetry, and this may
account for the suspicion that the difference between
science and poetry is that the former is literal in its
statements, whereas the latter is metaphorical.
Whatever the ideal of science, those who maintain that
it is literal, will do well to remember with Vaihinger, '
that "we form classes or theoretical propositions only
by neglecting numerous empirical factors." This is still
allied to the "psychic selection'' for pragmatic purposes,
wfiich w© found to be at the very roots of human perception
and language. (cf.Piaget and Halinowski).
A comparison which employs abstract terms is no less
a comparison than that whict). uses concrete imagery, whether
abstract or concrete in its imaginative values, language
seems to be thoroughly metaphorical. Vaihinger called
Kant a great metaphorician, not metaphysician.
"The recognition that many of the most popular sub-
jects of discussion are infested with symbolically
blank but emotively active words of this kind is a nec-
essary preliminary to the extension of scientific method
^* Adler.'op. cit. (p.~99). ~ ~~
^* Vaihinger, Hans.—The philosophy of "As If". A System of the
Theoretical, Practical, and Religious Fictions of Mankind,
(trans. CK.Ogden). Harcourt, Brace. New York. 1924.
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to these questions. Another is some technique by which to
ascertain which words are of this nature and on what
o<^casions. . .But the ultimate settlement of this matter
can hardly be expected until tests in some way independent
of the opinion of the speaker are obtained,"
Purpose is a factor affecting vocabulary, even when
it is not a conscious element in the speaker's ijiind.
Sometimes it dictates the choice of symbol-word when the
thought or reference is unchanged. Thus we accommodate
our vocabulary to the capacities of our listener, without
necessarily changing our references. And sometimes a
difference in purpose will bring tt about that two dif-
ferenff references or thoughts will be symbolized by the
same symbol. (Thus, if I understand by the word "Religion",
which I expect to denigrate, the formulae and organization
of the outward church, and my interlocutor, purposing my
conversion, understands by the same word a certain aware-
ness of the supernatural, we are well launched in Controversy.)
The Polysemia of this word "Religion" has oeen in-
terestingly listed by Carnfiy: (1) a system of practices;
(2) an habitual preoccupation with the divine intervention
in human things; (3) a system of beliefs; (4) a certain
sense of the supernatural; (5) faith; (6) the ordering of
life toward a supernatural goal; (7) a special life, such
^* Ogden and Richards. Op. cit. (p. 229),
1
as that of "the religious'', or monk; (8) Christian re-
ligion and especially the Catholic; (9) religions whatso-
ever; 110) sentiments lifting us above ourselves, as the
1.
religion of art, of beauty, etc.
Unless, then, we locate our references, what an
admirable chance of getting lost.* Can we wonder at the
mountains of verbiage of merely avalanchal force that
have been poured out over this word of multiple meaning?
An unawareness of the symbolic- emotive distinction
engenders all sorts of confiisions in the discussion of
poetry. People quibble over the truth- statement of verse,
and if they can follow the trail of this, they believe
that they have understood the poetry. Many, even in high
pedagogical places, have no respect for a poem that can-
not be transliterated into rational prose, or that does
not contain some "message" usually aphoristic. But the
poet's words, if he be a true poet and not a rhyming
thinker, are often not used for the sake of their truth
or falsity, but for the sake such attitudes as tneir
acceptance will evoke. "Provided that the attitude or
feeling is evoked, the most important function of such
language is fulfilled, and any symbolic function that the
words may have is instrumental only, and subsidiary to
the evocative." ^*
^* Carnoy. Op. clt. (p. 120).
^' Ogden and Richards. Op. cit. (p. 259),
cQ
On this accoimt, a particularly pernicious ignorance
of the whole realm of non-symbolic reference is fostered
in students, and a great deil of their aesthetic poten-
tialities are irremediably crippled. 'Statements may be
true symbolically (True^) , or true emotively (True^).
"It ought to be impossible to pretenfi that any
scientific statement can give a more insj)iring or a
more profoaind "vision of reality" than another, ^t can
be more general or more useful, and that is all. On the
other hand, it ought tb be impossible to talk about
poetry or religion as thought they were capable of giving
"knowledge", especially since "knowledge"' as a term has
been so overworked from both sides that it is not longer
of much service. A poem or a religion, though religions
have so definitely exploited the confusion of function
which we are now considering, and are so dependent upon
it, as to be unmistakably pathological growths has no
concern with limited and direct reference. It tells us,
or should tell us, nothing. It has a different, though
an equally important and a far more vital function... What
it does, or should do, is to induce a fitting attitude
to experience." ^'
"The remddy. ..is to cut our *pseudo-statements » free
from belief, and yet retain them, in this released state,
as the main instruments by which we order our attitudes to
Op. cit. (p. 269).
c
one another and to the world."
This remedy suggested by Richards, is a long way
from applicable in the present state of society. As the
satirist Cabell says, "Mundus vult decipi"; when we ex-
amine how society bends its members to function in con-
formity, we discover that the blind force of instinctive
emotions clustered about habits and prejudices is prin-
cipally operative, and that the great bulk of humankind
cannot act without particular sets of firm beliefs.
"it may be offered'', says Adler, "that there are three
stages in the liberation of human thought, first, the stage
of universal belief, secondly, the introduction of rational
criteria for the determination of the validity of belief,
and, thirdly, the independence of thinking from any belief
whatsoever. The second is the stage of scientific and
dogmatic criticism; the third is the achievement of the
philosophical attitude. . . "
^*
Nevertheless, although we cannot expect the remedy to
be applied, progress intiilectually is made by the refine-
ments of distinctions between types and degrees of belief,
each of which is fitted into its own realm of discourse.
Next we turn to analyze the components of Meaning
in the actual language- situations of speaker and hearer,,
where other determiners of meaning are to be found.
Richards, I. A.— Science and Poetry. «V, W.Norton & Co.
New York. 1926. (p. 72).
^* Adler. Op. cit. (p. 246).
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CHAPTER V
Meaning in Language-Situations
Language is a tool primarily for the communication
of thoughts or attitudes. As such, it implies the polarity
of speaker and hearer. Even in soliloquy, the speaker is
assuming the role of listener as well. An understanding
of the meanings of single words and their semantic flex-
ibilities is not enough, even when accompanied by an ac-
quaintance with the various routes of definition and
ambiguities of usage, to bring about the most valid in-
terpretation. vVe must glance at the f\mctioning of lan-
guage in the bi-polar speech transaction*
Communication tsikes place when one mind so actsX^
upon its environment that another mind is influenced,
and in the latter an experience occurs which is like
the experience in the first mind, and is caused in part
by that experience.
If we consider first the point of view of the hearer,
we perceive that he must discriminate the sensory sounds
that embody the words. In spoken language, the hearer
must break up the contimuum of sound into groupings that
make separate words or phrases, i.e. he must recognize
the sound as a word, must give it a context with further

axperiences other than sounds. The educator knows that
many children seem more stupid than they are, not because
they cannot interpret words as symbols, but because they
cannot discriminate sounds to the degree necessary to
have them assume the role of symbols. Adults, too, differ
in the ear for sounds, and this affects the ease of ac-
quiring languages. Thirdly, the hearer must grasp the
structure by which complex symbols are organized to stand
for complex referents. The study of these forms is a
part of Grammar. Words in sentences mutufelly explain each
other, their meanings are modified by their contexts. And
a transition of the attention is involved, from the total
experience, which throughout remains in consciousness, to
the successive elements which are one after another
focused by it.
Let us look at communication from the point of view
of the speaker or writer. First of all, we must note a
distinction between those "for whom reference governs
symbol, and those for whom symbol governs reference."
That is to say, we may roughly class minds as being
either able to choose words to adapt to varying inten-
tions, or unable to make use of other words for their
references than those which habit has fixedly linked
with theqi. The distinction between word-dependence and

word-freedom is one of the starting points for linguistic
investigation. Education should endeavor to make the
choice of words more flexible, for intellectual progress,
although not to be confused with the acquisition of vo-
cabulary, is highly correlated with it.
Proceeding then, to analyze the function, or burden,
of language as fi-amed by the speaker, we observe;
I. Stricfe Symbolization, the sense-core, the effort to
refer to a reference pure and simple. (This function
comprises all that division of language-action known as
"symbolic''. The remaining functions have to do with the
affective side of speech.)
II. The Attitude of the speaker toward the hearer. V/e may
say the same thing differently to different listeners.
III. The Attitude of the speaker toward the Referent.
Thus I might speak of the doggerel of Guest, while I
said the poetry of Keats.
IV. The Intention, effect we wish produced, may affect the
symbol choice. Wh^ we hope to persuade another to our
way of thought, we employ favorable connotations.
V» The Ease or Difficulty with which we grasp a mental
concept, or make a reference, is a factor in word-choice.
This element of the speech-situation gives rise to a
class of words which Ogden and Richards call "Mendicants",
o
i.e. terms thrown out tentatively in the effort to
catch some still vague object of the speaker's consci-
ousness. Such words must not be pounced upon in dispute,
as if they v/ere final framings of the speaker *s meaning;
the mind may summon up more precise tools of reference
when challenged to do so.
These five components of the normal utterance (which
may be abbreviated to the words JSense, Feeling, Tone, In-
tention, and Grasp) are highly important for the inter-
pretation of linguistic activities, thus what we are
required to interpret is not the mere objective stimuli,
print or sound, as in the traditional grammatical anal-
ysis of speech, but the psychological factors that lie
beneath the final formulation.
Whitehead, in discussing the role of symbols in social
cpntexts, emphasizes tnis affective power of language.
He says, 'When we examine how a society bends its in-
dividual members to function in conformity with its
needs, we discover that an important operative agency is
our vast system of inherited symbolism. . .The responses of
action to symbol may be so direct as to cut out any
effective reference to the ultimate thing symbolized.
This elimination of meaning is called ''reflex action'.
Sometimes there does intervene some effective reference
to the meaning of the symbol. B^t this meaning is not
cf. Ogden and Richards. Op. cit. (p, 357ff
.
) •
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recalled with the particularity and definiteness which
would yield any rational enlightenment as to the specific
action required to secure the final end. The meaning is
vague but insistent. Its insistence plays the part of
hypnotizing the individual to complete the specific action
associated with the symbol...
"But in fact the symbols evoke loyalties to vaguely
conceived notions, fundamental for our spiritual natures.
The result is that our natures are stirred to suspend
all antagonistic impulses, so that the symbol procures
its required response in action. Thus the social sym-
bolism has a double meaning, ^t means pragmatically the
direction of individuals to specific action; and it also
means theoretically the vague ultimate reasons with their
emotional accompaniment, whereby the symbols acquire
their power to organize the miscellaneous crowd into a
smoothly running community. Thus in an army, there is
one set of circumstances, and there is another set to
produce a general sense of the iii5)ortance of the duties
1.
performed.
"
Turning from the social power of the symbol, we find
that logical analysis of language has often been embar-
rassed by what Br^al calls the "Subjective jslement". If
I say of someone, "He has, happily, arrived''', the "happily"
refers not to him but to me, to my state of mind. When I
^' Whitehead, A.N.—Symbolism, its Meaning and Effect.
Macmillan & Co. New York. 1927. (pp. 73-6).
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make a syllogism, the words which integrate the different
clauses of my argioment relate to the Subjective Element,
they appeal to the understanding, and are not, therefore,
of the ssone order as the words which I use to expound
the actual facts tkemselves. Indeed, all writing of a
vivid character 'may take the form of a dialogue with
,
1.
the reader."
The prevalent blend of this subjective element in
language, which related to the speaker's attitude toward
both his subject-matter and his hearer, suggests that
language is largely "dialectical", i.e. is the art of
persuasion to a desired action of attitude. But dia-
lectic implies opposition, and "a philosophical theory
therefore, must be viewed as a fragment or piece of dia-
lectic incompletely carried out.... It is dialextically
inconclusive in that the opposition which the system
engenders is temporarily ignored... And any science
(also) is merely one of many possible analyses og a
given actual whole." ^*
Thus the polarities of discourse arise out of the
psychic selection that is characteristic of all human
perception and necessary for mental orgsinization. In the
effort to transcend these opposites, the method of dialectic
has been evolved. ''Dialectic is in part a process of def-
inition, to clarify issues... and it is in part a process
Brdal, Michel. Op. cit. (p. 229>.
2.
Adler, M.J. Op. cit. (pp. 227-240).

of recognizing the opposition of assumptions and defin-
itions, seeking to resolve this opposition by formulating
a third set of propositions to include the conflicting ones.
No partial "universe of discourse" possesses finality,
there is always the possibility of including any two
partial xiniverses of discourse in a third which might re-
solve their ' differ ences or effect mutual translation be-
tween them, though this third might itself be partial and
require similar treatment.
In the four rules which Adler gives as the etiquette
of dialectic, we find the implicit recognition of the
several functions of note in the normal speech-situationj
I. The exhibition of emotion first. Once frankly exhibited,
the emotional factors are deprived of any ambiguous
logical function in the argument.
II Explicit postulation. The assumptions, or hypotheses,
or postulates, should be made apparent. Disagreement may
be traced back to a weakness in the axioms.
III. The attitude of impartiality. Dialectic arises in
partiality, for there is an intellectual option; but in
so far as it recognizes that the issue. .. arises through
arbitrary differences in definition and assumption, it
must assvime a certain impartiality toward the issue. (Dewey
mentions this as the paradox of thought, that born out of
ibid. (p. 36ff.).
(0
partiality, or concern with the issue, it must achietfe
a certain detached impartiality for best results.)
IV» The attitude of impr acticality. If argumsnts be taken
as purely intellectual affairs, the resistance to the
exposure of emotional determinajnts is removed, because
the temperamental bias is directed chiefly toward beliefs
having practical import. Dialectic must be entered on as
a play of the mind over possibilities, as an elaboration
of the ''if this, then that'' type of thinking.
A*
/V
An enlightened acquaintance with the study of Meaning
can make a beginning to clarify or resolve the time-
honored oppositions of thought. «»hen we see that words
are the end-products of psychological situations m which
the purely symbolic purpose is seldom alone; when we per-
ceive that emotive values, both intended and inadvertent,
are refracting our pictures of the referential pattern;
when we realize that words ao not embody, but only interpr
facts; and that facts are usually susceptible of other
interpretations; and that no interpretation is the most
correct, except in relation to its particular and partial
and selective system, or "universe of discourse"; then we
can begin to understand, and resolve the inconsistencies
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iljto an hierarchical grouping of systems, the evaluation
of whichnmkes up our "philosophy of life".
Here is the summary way that Richards treats the
ancient feud between Science and Religion (or Poetry):
"to declare that Science is autonomous is very different
from subordinating all our activit;^es to it. It is merely
to assert that so far as any body of references is emo-
tively undistorted, it belongs to science. It is not
in the least to assert that no reference may be distorted
If advantage can be gained thereby. And just as there
are innumerable human activities which require undis-
torted references if they are to be satisfied, so there
are innumerable other human activities not less impor-
tant, which equally require distorted references, or,
more plainly, fictions. The use of fictions, the imagin-
ative use of them, rather, is not a way of hoodwinking
ourselves. It is not a process of pretending to ourselves
that things are not as they are. It is perfectly com-
patible with the fullest and grimmest recognition of the
exeict state of affairs on all occasions. It is no make-
believe. But so awkwardly have our references and our
attitudes become entangles, that such pathetic spectacles
as Mr. Yeats trying desperately to believe in fairies...
1
. ft E
are all too common. ' A thing may be True or True •
• Richa-ds, I. A. --principles of literary Criticism. (p.-^26)
•1
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A fresh light is thrown upon the preoccupations
of traditional grammar by this view that speech presents
a number of distinguishable elements making up tiie sym-
bol-situation. The entire reformation of this study is
due, and has been already begun, notably in the work of
1.
Brunot, whose massive treatment of the French langmrngg
has rejected the old classifications by parts of speech,
and has outlined a thoroughly functional and psychological
approach. In America, a leader in this movement tov/ard
a more vital grammar is A.D.Sheffield. As yet, however,
the movement presents a poorly concerted front, due to
the fact that misconceptions introduced by the coercions
of language itself continue to trouble. ''No formal
apparatus of Canons and Rules, no demands that abuses of
language shall be reformed, will take effect, unless the
habits which will enable language to be freely used
3.
are developed,"
• Brunot, Ferdinand. -La PensSe et la Langue. Paris. 1922.
• Sheffield, A.D. —Command of Sentence Patterns. Scott, Foresman.
1929. N.Y. (also Grammar and Thinking. 1912).
• Ogden and Richards. Op. cit. (p. 380).
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CHAPTER VI
Meaning Theories in the Classroom
There is at present a meaaire of unrest in educational
circles, regarding the value of the instruction given to
pupils in the mastery of their own language, -^'he issue
usually boils down to the question "shall pupils be given
more grammar or less granmar?" In the study of the
English language, usage has been taught, but the ap-
proach to a science of language by way of Meaning and
Interpretation has never been systematized, largely be-
cause the matter of meaning has been considered to be
nothing more than a self-evident, though mystical affinity
of words for whatever the standards decree.
In the light of the material surveyed in the fore-
going study, it becomes evident that any pious tiopes for
instruction in "clear thinking" must begin to base their
practical procedures upon shrewder insights into the
nature of the language-medium itself, such as here adum-
brated.
Particularly is it important that the instructor
should clarify his attitudes toward language. Mental
torpor will exist to some degree in the average class-
room. But the deficiency which we allow in the pupil as
€
a function of his age and "l.Q,", is especially re-
pugnant in the teacher, what is annoying is the result-
ant confusion and waste of latent potentialities in the
minds of the pupils. A teacher who is himself subject
to the primitive coercions of language, no matter what
his proficiency in grammar and the "classics", will
not be able to evoke truly educated attitudes in the class.
•'l have not heard of any schoolmaster", says Richards J
"who may have attempted to make a systematic discussion
of the forms of meaning and the psychology of understanding
a part of his teaching Indeed, it is the oddest thing
about language, whose history is full of odd things ... that
so few people have sat down to reflect systematically
about meaning . . . In point of fact, there is no respectable
treatise on the theory of linguistic interpretation in
existence, and no person whose professional occupation
it is to inquire into the question and direct study in the
matter. Pro grammatical studies do not trespass upon this
topic. . .There is no other human activity for which theory
bears so small a proportion to pr actios .. .And if we ask
what is the most responsible for this neglect, the answer
should probably be "^Vanity'*. We are with difficulty
persuaded that we have much to learb about language, or
that our understanding about it is defective. . .The first
condition for the improvement in the adult *s use of language
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must be to disturb this ludicrous piece of seHf-deception.
But this distrustful attitude takes us but a little
way toward a cure. We must, if possible, gain some power
of diagnosis, some understanding of the risks that
interpretation run.. This may be considered too abstruse
and baffling a matter, bad enough for the determined
adult, and self-condemning as an educational suggestion.
The reply is that those who think so have probably
forgotten how abstruse and baffling every subject is
until it has been studied and the best methods of learning
and teaching it have been worked out...vVe ought to hes-
itate before deciding that a Theory of Interpretation in
some slightly more advanced and simplified form (with
perhaps a new notation and nomenclature to help it) may
not quite soon take the foremost place in the literary
subjects of all ordinary schools. As to the possibility
of practical steps, the only improvements in training
that can be suggested must be based upon a closer study
of Meaning and of the causes of Unnecessary misunderstanding...
"This, then, may be made a positive recommendation,
€hat an inquiry into language no longer confused with
the grammarian's inquiry into syntax, or with the logi-
cian's, or the philologist's studies be recognized as
a vital branch of research, and treated no longer as the
I
peculiar province of the whimsical amateur...
However incomplete, tentative, or indeed speculative
we may consider our present views on this subject, they
are far enough advanced to justify some exper i/mental
applications, if not in the school period, then certainly
at the Universities. If it be replied that there is no
time for an additional subject, we can answer by chal-
lenging the value of the time at present spent in ex-
tensive reading. A very slight improvement in the cap-
acity to understand would so immensely increase the value
of this time, that part of it would be exchanged with
advantage for direct training in reading, ihis applies
to such studies as economics, psychology, political theory,
theology, law, or philosophy, quite as much as to lit-
erature. . .The incidental training that everyone is sup-
posed to receive i^j the course of studying other sub-
jects is too fragmentary, accidental, and unsystematic
to serve this purpose. Sooner or later, interpretation
will have to be recognized as a key-subject. But only
the actual effort to teach such a subject will reveal
how it may best be taught.??
It is not within the province of this thesis to
erect and Integrate a detailed technique for the teach-
ing of Interpretmtion in the High School. Nor is it
suggested that the study of grammar and syntax should be
Richards.—Practical Criticism. Harcourt, Brace & Co.
New York, 1930. (p. 334ff
.
)
.
c
supplanted. But in the latter years of High School,
grammar no longer predominates. The construction of
sentences, and the correction of linguistic improprieties
have been strongly emphasized, so that improvement he-
comes merely a matter of reiteration and practice* At this
stage in the process of education, it seems logical to
suggest the introduction of a somewhat wider perspective,
treating language as an active and ubiquitous force
whose nature must be studied i^ we are not to remain
its dupes.
A syntactically perfect writer can lead thoughts
and feelings into the most uncritical by-paths of belief.
It seems a pity that millions of young minds should come
to the end of their schooling with no greater freedom
from the undesirable coercions of language than is to
be gained through the traditional approached. As soon
as the young person passes beyond the "instrumental" use
of language in commonplace situations, and beyond the
"prudential" use of language to satisfy school require-
ments, as soon as he attempts to think at all apart
from the pattern of ordinariness, he becomes embroiled
in the labyrinth of verbiage, whether he realizes it or
not. Even if he is mora than usually "sensible", he remains
"suggestible" to a degree that he cannot realize, and is
yr
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never able to exercise a perfectly critical jud^ent
to defend his mind against the impositions of cult,
advertisement, politics, crude moral and ethical suasions, etc.
"The power of words is the most conservative force in our
life... The coinnon inherited scheme of conception which
is all around us, and comes to us as naturally and un-
ob jectionably as our native air, is none the less imposed
upon us, and limits our intellectual movements in count-
less ways all the more surely and irresistibly be-
cause, being inherent in the very language we must use
to express the simplest meaning, it is adopted and assim-
ilated before we can so much as begin to think for our-
selves at all."
* *
The insemination of such an approach to language in
the classroom must, of course, proceed from above down-
ward; it is more important that the teacher himself be-
come familiar with the tenets of Meaning and Symbolism
than that he struggle to impart these matters in their
abstruse form to the pupils. As the arbiter of the dis-
cussions of all sorts that arise during the sourse of any
stimulating instruction, he will have the opportunity to
clarify the discrimination and judgment of his pupils by
example rather than by the rote of a forbidding system.
^* Quoted by Ogden and Richards (p. 34) from p.M.Cornford's
"prom Religion to philosophy" (p. 45).
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To the extent that a sane critique of language emerges
naturally to cope with the concrete situations met in
the course of grammar, composition and rhetoric, and the
study of literature, it will be quietly effective, and
not merely an added segment of the burden of instruction.
Nevertheless, it is possible to make a number of
suggestions, based on the foregoing study, pointing
toward the gradual emergence of a technique of language-
interpretation to be taught in the eleventh or twelfth
grades, in all instances, recommendations such as these
must be taken as merely suggestive, and must be adapted
to the needs and capacities of the group.
Perhaps amusement and interest might be aroused by
reading to the class some such delightful verbal ful-
1.
mination as the following, quoted from Edward Johnson:
" A. In my mind, TO REFORM means to make or form over
again , and nothing more... And when I hear of the reform-
ation of abuses . I understand that abuses have received
or are about to receive, or it is desired they should
receive, another and a different form .
B. OhJ but the word REFORM does not mean simply altera-
tion. ..It means something more than this.
A. Let us know wherein that something more consists.
B. vVhatever be the intrinsic, etymological meaning, it
is universally used to express alteration for the better .
^' Johnson, Edward. --Nuces Phi^-osophicae. Op. clt. (p. 56-9).
i
A» Be it so. But this only shifts the difficulty from
one word to another. I desire to know the meaning of
the word BETTER.
B. Is not this mere quibbling?
A. For pity's sake spare me that wretched pleas of
the ignorant that miserable 'refuge of the destitute
in argument'. Your very question 'Is it not quibbling?'
convicts you of ignorance, por if you had a clear idea
of the meaning of the word BETTER, you would have an-
swered me at once, without stopping to ask whether or
not I am quibbling. But you asked me that foolish question
merely because you did NOT know the meaning of the word
BETTER, and were ashamed to confess it. you asked me
that question because you could not answer mine because
you felt puzzled and because you were unwilling to
believe that you had been using a word all your life
without knowing what it means. There are many who resort
to this plea. No sooner do you attempt to compel them
to talk intelligibly no sooner do you request them to
give you a clear definition of the meaning of the words
they use than they st4p you with; 'Sir, this is mere
quibbling] ' Such talkers are only fit to discuss with
their wives the mysteries of the manufacture of a pudding
or a pie-crust..."
——
- Shades of the other, and more famous, johnsoni

A provocative discussion of Meaning, taken up where
this quotation leaves off, might result In the appoint-
ment hy the class of a committee on word-meanings, em-
powered to look up and report to the class the etymology
and semantic changes of any words that are met with In
the course of study. Thus gradually the scaffolding
of a classification such as the one outlined In the
chapter on Semantics might be erected. Such work should
be understood to be subordinate to the grasp of meaning
In actual speech-situations. The terminology of Carnoy
need not be retained, for It Is a simple matter to
find good working substitutes for the less rigorous
purposes of the classroom. Although the meaning changes
of Metasemla may be of merely academic Interest, like
the study of etymology for Its own sake, the meaning
changes of Diasemla have a liveliness and a variety that
suggest their study could be made definitely engrossing.
Particularly Is this so in the case of both poetical
and slang metaphor. This division of Semantics can be
brought hom« to the pupil in a way that no grammatical
analysis of language into static "parts of speech"' can
hope for.
A knowledge of the nature of language should contain
at an early stage some indication of the Indirect relation
of Word, Thought, and Thing. A diagram such as that given
r
on page 49 will be serviceable to clarify matters, and
show that the Thought, or Reference, intervenes and
must be recognized in every instance.
Corollary to this, the class should be taught, by
such illustrations as come naturally to mind, that the
distribution of words over the nature of Heality, as
well as over the field of thought, is highly unequal.
Instances of a group of fairly close synonyms can be
offset by instances of such words as "Religion" that
are made to cover nearly a dozen distinguishable mental
references, (see page 73). A study of the latter pheno-
menon (Polysemia) is fruitful to enlighten thinking.
This may lead naturally to the polysemia of the
qui^jtessential word "Meaning", and from examples made
to emerge from current usages, the teacher can elicit
as many as a dozen of the meanings, (see page 64). Such
a list, copied into notebooks, may be referred to in
many subsequent discussions intended to clarify the
problem of meaning. Pupils should be taught that it
is better to recognize the fact of many applications
than to accept the fiat of some authority, that only
one of these is right and they must forget the others.
Supplementary to a knowledge of current types of
meaning, pupils may tackle the problem of how we define,
and here, too, they may be made to discover within their
r
own attempts a number of the commoner coordinates of
definition as listed on page 58» As a result, they
should be given exercises, suggested by the teacher,
which will train them to indicate the particular set
of definition-coordinates used. And they should recog-
nize that such a set is comparable to the axioms which
were learned in Geometry, out of which all the system
flows.
One of the results of a wise attention to the prob-
lem of definition will be a dislodging of the primitive
notion of words as containing unique kernels of meaning.
And another mjght be the recognition of the linguistic
and emotive nature of hypostatized or Personified quali-
ties and generalizations. The use of such as convenient
fictions is not discouraged. Thus the pupils may gain
a discrimination between the conveniences of language
(which permits general terms as abbreviations, for the
wielding of more complex symbols) and the actualities
of the objective world.
A very important snd simple distinction that can
find endless application, is that between the symbolic
and the emotive content of word-meanings. This matter
has already found mention in texts on the teaching of
language.'''* A line can be divided so that its parts
are roughly proportional to the respective amounts of
see Blaisdell,T.C.—Ways to Teach English. Garden 5Jity.
Doubleday, Dor an & Co. Inc. 1930.
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symbilic and emotive meaning that the word suggests.
During the course of some grammatical or rhetorical
study, an analysis of the speech-situation can be engineered
to reveal the five functions of the normal utterance, as
listed on page 79. Subsequently, examples can be sought
by the class in literary passages, and exercises may be
devised by positing a change in one of the four latter
functions and determining what change would occur in
the original, (i.e. a passage may be given; the teacher
may posit for the author a different attitude toward his
expected audience; or a different attitude toward his
subject matter; and then the class is to translate the
passage into the appropriate style.)
Prom this it is a simple step to the introduction
of exercises designed to familiarize the pupils with
the variety of interpretations that may be made of a
given matter. Such exercises may be called Translation
(within the language). Ti'anslation was suggested by Lady
Welby as a technique for evaluating metaphors. "But there
is a method both of discovering, testing, and using analogy,
the value of which does not yet seem to be recognized;
and this may be called in an extended sense translation.
It would automatically sift the superficial or partial
from the deep or complex likeness; and it would lead to
the recognition of a wide difference between the casual.
r
the merely illustrative analogy, and that which indicated
inter-relationships not yet recognized and utilized." ^*
She suggested that through Translation of metaphor, sim-
ile, etc., we might distinguish (1) casual likeness; (2)
general likeness, with unlikeness of constituents; (3^
likeness in all but one point or feature; (4) valid
analogy; (5) exact equivalen^^e; (6) correspondence in
each point and in mass, as the reflection in a mirror;
and (7) what might be called temporary or local analogies.
But Translation exercises can be made to apply to more
than simple metaphors that arise in reading. The pupils
may start with a recognition of any number of styles
of utterance. (Carnoy notes: (1) the noble, or literary;
(2) the normal; (3) the familiar or trivial; (4) the vulgar
(5) ironic slang; (6) the rude, scurrilous, defamatory.)
There need be nothing arbitrary about classifications
into levels of discourse. Indeed, Rostand's "Cyrano"
goes in for a different set of discriminations, as he
describes his own nose for the bedazzlement of the fop
who lacked the wit to insult him:
Cyrano: Ah, no, young man, that is not enoughJ yovl might
have said, dear me, there are a thousand things .varying
the tone..por instance. .Here you are: Agressive: "I,
monsieur, if I had such a nose, nothing would serve but
I must cut it offi" Amicable: "it must be in your way
while drinking; you ought to have a special beaker madeJ "
^* Welby( -Gregory)
,
Lady v. --What is Meaning? London.
Macmillan & Co. Ltd. 1903. (p. 120).
r
Descriptive: "it is a cragJ... a peak'... a promontoryi . .
.
A promontory, did I say? ...It is a peninsulaJ" Inquisitive
"what may the office be of that oblong receptacle? Is it
an ink-horn or a scissor-case? " Mincing; "do you so dote
on birds, you have, fond as a father, been at pains to
fit the little darlings with a roost?" Blunt: "Tell me,
monsieur, you, when you smoke, is it possible you blow
the vapor through your nose without a neighbor crying The
chimney is afire'?" Anxious: "Go with caution, I beseech,
lest your head, dragged over by that weight, should drag
you overi" Tender: "Have a little sun-shade made for it
J
It might get freckled.*" and so on, through Learned;
Off-hand; Emphatic; Dramatic; Admiring; Lyrical; Simple;
Deferent; Rustic; Military; Practical; and parodic of
the Mythic.
Such an example is merely suggestive. The exercise is
to translate the meaning-content of a selected passage
into another realm of discourse. All the class might
be set to translate a commonplace passage into the
noble style, or vice versa; or each member might be set
a different task, one to do the Boble, one the Intimate,
one the Academic, etc., and the results read aloud.
The purpose of Translation exercises is not primarily
amusement, but an increase in the flexibility of the
pupil's handling of language. This is allied to the
r
sedulous apeing of literary styles professed by Stevenson,
but has the advantage of appearing more novel, more
germane to the natural, non-literary instincts of the
pupil. It is my conviction that the value of Travesty
and the Mimetic has not been utilized sufficiently to
Intrigue and instruct. A skillful teacher will have no
difficulty in making such exercises zestful.
And the Translation suggested by Lady Welby, of
metaphors which is nothing more than the attempt to
erect a new sign-chain abutting on the same referent, or
conveying the same meaning will serve to indicate to
the students the difference between the prose-metaphor,
having merely an Illustrative function, and a metaphor
that belongs to poetry, having an untranslatable, vague.
Ineffable, emotive value. In this way, a discrimination
may be brought out that will preserve the pupil from the
common mistake of seeking for literalness in a poem, and
failing to recognize the value of the purely poetic
utterance.
A companion technique to Translation, one which is
extremely important in the critical operation of Symbolic
Theory, and which deserves more emphasis in the class-
room effort to teach clear thinking, is Expansion.
It is necessary for the student to know that lan-
guage is overridden with symbols which are abbreviations.

9j
or contractions for convenience' sake, ^o long as con-
venience is served, well and good; but.lt happens often
that dispute will be foiind to cetter around a symbol,
or group of symools organized into a statement, the char-
acteristic of which is this same contraction. All cases
of linguistic "puns" can be traced to this fact of con-
traction. And paradox is only so because of contraction
in the symbols embodying it. In such cases, the symbols
must be expanded to the point where the source of the
difficulty is located. We might, for instance, find that
the word GOOD, as expanded to suit the meaning of one
context, became "that which is beneficial to me"; while
in the next line iti expansion might yield "a moral or
ethical virtue"; and the unscrupulous coercion of the
argument that tried to confoimd these two meanings by
the use of a contracted symbol common to both, would be
exposed. It may be left to the teacher to discover in-
stances of contracted symbols which it would be fruitful
for the class to expand and discuss. Such instances should
be incidental to the clarifying of some concrete situation
that has arisen in the course of discussion.
These are the main suggestions derived from the study
of Theories of Meaning. Further insights deserving of elab-
oration may be discovered by the teacher who interests
himself. Examples of ambiguity in phrases will be watched
e
The technique ofDialectic Is founded on a recogni-
tion of the limitations of language as revealed by the
Science of Symbolism and Meaning; it recognizes the
arbitrary nature of definition as interpretation; and
realizes that consistency within a realm of discourse
is all that can be hoped for; and it elaborates a pro-
cess to clarify issues by the endless formal pattern of
definition, opposition, analysis, synthesis, definition,
opposition, etc. Dialectic of course, does not fall
within the province of this thesis, but the ground-
work of dialectic will have been laid if the attitude
tov/ard language which comes with a study of Meaning
Theories is attained. Ana the rudiments of the art of
conversation, so long lost in the frenetic grubbing for
"the facts", may come to be gathered indirectly in the
course of such study as is here suggested. For many an
age to come, there will be problems of the human mind
that are not open to laboratory solution; and in the
meantime, a maturer culture may be founded in education
by discriminating among the functions and coercions of
language, and by training the mind to navigate the
shoals of thought with flexibility and amenity.
cr'
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